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ABSTRACT 
 
KOSOVO AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW DO POST-CONFLICT 
MEASURES AFFECT THE INTERGROUP RELATIONS ACROSS THE 
COUNTRY? 
Zeqine Sheshi 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution, M.A. Thesis, September 2018 
Thesis Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Kerem Yıldırım 
This study is a work focused on the post-conflict situation in Kosovo, its reconciliation 
process and the state of the intergroup relations between its two biggest ethnic groups, the 
Albanian majority and Serb minority. It offers an extended literature review on ethnic 
conflict resolution and reconciliation paired with a strong consideration of social 
psychology focusing on identity and intergroup relations. By offering an interlaced view of 
these separate bodies of work, it seeks to bring a new perspective to observe the Kosovo 
case. It presents a discussion of the events that shaped Kosovo for what is it today, keeping 
the focus on society and perceptions. To strengthen the hold of the situation, it presents 
results from direct fieldwork conducted with the subjects of the discussed case. The study 
emphasizes the role and impact reconciliatory measures have on divided societies yet as its 
findings suggest, it brings into consideration that in such conditions, reconciliatory 
processes might be incomplete thus leading into a dysfunctional relationship between such 
measures and the society they are supposed to improve. This study on Kosovo emphasizes 
that the country has failed to conduct a properly structured reconciliation process centrally, 
which has closed the way to any improvement of the intergroup relations on its societal 
levels.  
Keywords: Kosovo War, Reconciliation Process, Ethnic Conflict, Intergroup Relations 
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ÖZET 
 
KOSOVA VE GEÇİŞ DÖNEMİ ADALETİ: ÇATIŞMA SONRASI UZLAŞMA 
SÜRECİNİN GRUPLARARASI İLİŞKİLERE ETKİSİ 
Zeqine Sheshi 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Eylül 2018 
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Kerem Yıldırım  
Bu çalışma, Kosova’daki çatışma sonrası durum, uzlaşma süreci ve en büyük iki etnik grup 
olan Arnavut çoğunluğun ve Sırp azınlığının arasındaki ilişkilerin durumu üzerine 
odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı etnik çatışma çözümü ve uzlaşma üzerine, kimlik ve 
gruplar arası ilişkilere odaklanan bir sosyopsikolojik yaklaşım ile eşleştirilmiş ve 
genişletilmiş bir literatür taraması sunmaktır. Ayrıca ayrıştırılmış bu kurumların iç içe 
geçmiş bir görünümünü sunarak Kosova davasını gözlemlemek için yeni bir bakış açısı 
getirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Böylece, Kosova’yı bugünkü duruma göre şekillendiren, 
topluma ve algılara odaklanan olayları tartışır. Bu mevcut durumun anlaşılması için 
insanlar ile yürütülen doğrudan saha çalışmasının sonuçlarını sunar. Çalışma, uzlaşmacı 
tedbirlerin bölünmüş toplumlar üzerindeki rolünü ve etkilerini vurguluyor, ancak bulguların 
öne sürdüğü gibi bu tür durumlarda uzlaşma süreçlerinin yetersiz olması durumunda 
tamamlamayabileceği ve böylelikle bu önlemler ile iyileştirilmesi gereken toplum arasında 
işlevsiz bir ilişkiye yol açtığını da dikkate alıyor. Kosova konusundaki bu çalışma, ülke 
çapında gruplararası ilişkilerin toplumsal düzeylerinde herhangi bir iyileşmeye sebep 
verecek olan ve aynı zamanda düzgün bir şekilde yapılandırılmış bir uzlaşma sürecini 
gerçekleştiremediğini vurgulamaktadır.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kosova Savaşı, Etnik Çatışma, Gruplararası İlişkiler, Uzlaşma Süreci 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Almost twenty years after the armed conflict and a decade following its unilateral 
independence declaration, Kosovo has been the object of several studies on peace-building, 
international intervention and the legal framework of the secession from the former 
Yugoslavia. However, there have been only a handful of research that have focused on the 
post-conflict period, with even less focusing on social structures, the challenges of being a 
new state and how it is scoring in bringing a long-term settlement to the ethnic issues in the 
area
1
. 
Despite the great effort made by international bodies alongside actors in the region and the 
Kosovar state itself, there is still no reliable result in terms of peace and stability in the area. 
There is high unemployment, infrastructural issues, a lack of trust in institutions, thousands 
of internally displaced individuals, social division and inter-ethnic incidents. Kosovo is 
heavily divided between Albanians and Serbs. Many of them experience mutual fear, 
mistrust, hate, and grievances in relation to the other ethnic community (Staub, 2006). They 
live in their own communities and there is only limited contact between them. The 
Kumanovo Agreement has not changed the quality of the relationship between Albanians 
and Serbs in Kosovo as it was just a deal to end the bloodshed (Kelman H. , 2008, p. 119). 
The state of the relationship is important because it is precisely this that lies at the center of 
the ethnic conflict (Auberach, 2009, p. 294)and it still has an escalatory potential. The 
examples of Bosnia and Rwanda show that an ethnic conflict is likely to flare up again 
when no attention is paid to inter-ethnic relations (Bar Tal, 2000, p. 362).  
                                                          
1 (Zyberi & Letnar Cernic, 2015) Transitional Justice Processes and Reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia: Challenges 
and Prospects. Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 33(2), 132-157; (Zupan, 2006) Facing the past and transitional justice in 
countries of former Yugoslavia. Peacebuilding and civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ten years after Dayton, 327-
342.; (Di Lellio & McCurn, 2013) Engineering Grassroots Transitional Justice in the Balkans: The Case of Kosovo. East 
European Politics and Societies, 27(1), 129-148.  
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This study focuses on the post conflict period and more precisely on the popular 
perspective on this period after the placement of certain milestones like the declaration of 
independence or the establishment of War Crimes Tribunal. It aims to bring light to the 
transitional policies and the process often referred by the Kosovo political scene and the 
international bodies: the reconciliation process. The reconciliation process is a very 
complex, multilayered process whose purpose and hoped result is shifting from a violent, 
hostile past to a commonly built and improved future (Davies & Kaufman, 2002, p. 162). 
Its most important aspect is that it stands for a long term improvement of relations and not 
an immediate solution. So it is not only a process but a goal too (Freeman & Hayner, 2003, 
p. 609) and this study aims to analyze it as both a process and an outcome of the multitude 
of attempts at dealing with the post-conflict issues.  
As the study unfolds through what the parts of such process are and how they have been 
implanted in the country, it discovers that despite the tries of the international bodies and an 
apparent interest on its development on part of Kosovo and Serbia alike, the process 
stretches through political interests more than it aims to deal with the post-conflict period. 
The extended analysis on how Kosovo domestically deals with post-reconciliation looks at 
how the process reaches social groups and individuals as their smallest unit, however the 
findings suggest that reaching this level of impact is harder in secessionist states and deeply 
divided societies. This study on Kosovo and the field work’s inquiry on transitional justice 
reaching people offer a look on the socio-psychological dimensions of secessionism 
through armed activism and how the state structures may steer away from what the 
literature teaches about closing such violent chapters of the past for and because of a series 
of factors like corruption, weak structures, lack of political class or instrumentalisation of 
past events. 
Aim of This Study 
For the future of Kosovo’s people, it is important that conditions change in order to enable 
the establishment of a state with one political, social, economic, legal and educational 
system (Bar Tal, 2000, p. 355). This requires the construction of a new system which is 
based on peaceful, cooperative and trustful relations (Bar Tal, 2000, p. 356). Reconciliation 
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as a form of post-conflict intervention focuses precisely on changing the relationship 
between rival groups in this way. 
So my main research question is to address how Kosovo conducted the reconciliation 
process up to this point in terms of state and individual level, while focusing on the ethnic 
groups, considering the intergroup element central to this thesis. It is followed by the aim of 
understanding whether the steps in the reconciliation route have contributed to the 
improvement of the social and political situation in the country. Lastly, it looks at what can 
be learned from these experiences for future work on the field.  
This study brings a two layered analysis on the post-conflict status. Firstly, it offers a 
descriptive analysis on the state-engineered transitional policies and reconciliatory 
measures, with a focus on the policies directly concerning and addressing the people of 
Kosovo. Secondly, it tries to bring an oral account of the response and effect such measures 
have garnered throughout the population, in an attempt to touch upon the feelings, mindset 
and conscience of the people.  
Considering the emotive side of the topic, this work unfolds through asking several 
questions trying to address the main question of the public perception on the post-conflict 
measures and its effect on ethnically divided groups’ relations. The questions this study 
aims to answer are: What has the Kosovar state officially done to deal with the post-conflict 
requirements put by international institutions, how do the citizens address the post-conflict 
reconciliation process, what are the stories and approach the people offer, what can be 
learned from the efforts for reconciliation in Kosovo and lastly what recommendations can 
be made for further progress of reconciliation. 
Importance of This Study 
An important motivation for this study is the fact that Kosovo deeply lacks of academic 
data and corpus. This leaves the study of important events to investigators who in more 
cases than not, lack linguistic and local contextual knowledge. They are heavily distrusted 
by the population because of the sensitivity of the issue and their identities. This means that 
there might be partial outcomes in terms of representability and reliability. Foreign 
researchers also tend to focus on more ‘mediatized’ events and territories in Kosovo such as 
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the North. This means that while they opt for the analysis of a particular case, the latter 
being an outlier would offer a result that might be not as representative of the countrywide 
situation. I encounter these issues several times during the literature review of this thesis 
and would thus present this thesis as an attempt at a modest contribution to the solution of 
these issues.
2
  
In terms of what this study brings in practice, it is that it offers a new analysis of 
transitional justice and reconciliatory policies in a fragile case such as Kosovo, drawing on 
their limitations and scope. It brings a psychological and sociological approach to a 
political process. Kosovo is located in a heavily conflicted geographical region, surrounded 
by countries still in difficult terms and struggling to improve their economic, political and 
social conditions while heavily affecting all the region. For this reason, understanding the 
direct relation of post-conflict state policies and civil reaction would help in setting a 
precedent and example for future projects in the area. Lastly, it aims to show that dealing 
with such complex sociopolitical processes on part of any state apparatus requires 
knowledge on an array of disciplines such as social psychology, anthropology, law and 
history rather than just a strong political mindset.  
 
Outline of This Study 
The study is based on the reconciliation literature omitting the purely political discourses 
around the topic such as peace-building or international law. The methodology of the study 
divides into a descriptive analysis of the country-wide reconciliation process then of the 
selected cases of Peje and Gjakove, selected by the investigator as a most similar case 
design. It presents results from a fieldwork conducted in the selected municipalities with 
semi-structured interviews to elucidate the perception of the population and whether the 
reconciliation process or the attempts to it have any effect on intergroup perceptions and 
relations.  
                                                          
2 (Clark J. , 2014) Kosovo's Gordian knot: the contested north and the search for a solution.; (Burema, 2012) 
Reconciliation in Kosovo: A few steps taken, a long road ahead.; (Yannis, 2009) The politics and geopolitics of the status 
of Kosovo: the circle is never round. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 9(1-2), 161-170.  
5 
 
The first chapter concentrates on literature on reconciliation, what defines it and its 
importance, and a wide discussion of intergroup perceptions, relations and its fragility as 
relevant concepts in the second half. The second chapter discusses the methodology 
followed for this study and its limitations. The third chapter focuses on the discussion of the 
transitional justice measures and reconciliation process in Kosovo as it sheds light to 
agreements, new institutions as part of the reconciliation process. The fourth and last 
chapter discusses the common themes, patterns found in the fieldwork in Peje and Gjakove, 
as it offers the observations from the fieldwork carried by the investigator and implications 
from these observations and how they may translate into a wider panorama by joining these 
findings with the data brought by the analysis from the third chapter.  
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1. DEFINING CONFLICT AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS, AN 
OVERVIEW ON THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
 
 
 
 
As Kosovo enters its 9
th
 year of independence and the 18
th
 of peace since the official 
end of the war in 2000, consequences of the bloody conflict are still present in the life of 
the government, the civil society and the ordinary people. Despite multiple international 
and national attempts to come to terms with the issues arisen since years ago concerning the 
political agenda and the everyday life, those issues are still aflame and continue to perplex 
not only policy makers but academicians and civil workers alike. The core of the problem, 
as we assess from a deeper analysis of the historical background of the conflict, lies in the 
fact that, considering the conflict’s majorly ethnic and subtly religious nature, these 
particular divergences stand intact in the society as of today.  
What history has taught us so far is that people need assistance in order for them to learn 
how to live peacefully and in mutual respect (Stephan, 2001, p. 2). This seemingly simple 
statement is more complex at a second look and it comes as a result of years of tragic 
experience on the shoulders of human race. People have not been able to co-exist, they 
have fought for clashing interests, they have lost or won and they have had to come to 
terms with the results of their behavior for the good or the bad. The aftermath of such 
episodes has left space for the birth or the development of new relations, ones that base 
their structure on mutual forgiveness, trust and hope for the future. The real question is how 
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to move to mutual forgiveness, build the needed trust and construct a vision of a better 
future in a peaceful togetherness? 
As previous examples like South Africa, Rwanda or Northern Ireland demonstrate, settling 
conflicting interests is not enough to guarantee a stable end to a conflict. In order to achieve 
a stable closure to a conflict “one must deal directly and openly with the past of pain and 
loss that created emotional and perceptual barriers of victimhood, guilt, distrust and fear” 
(Barkan, 2001) quoted by (Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008, p. 5). For these reasons, the 
look into exiting literature that I conducted expands on two pillars: transitional justice and 
intergroup relations. The model I base the literature review on is that brought by Parmentier 
(2003): the TARR model. It establishes 4 elements with which post-conflict measures are 
expected to deal with: Truth establishing (acknowledging the past), Accountability of the 
crimes (accountability for the past), Reparation for victims (acknowledging the past), and 
Reconciliation of the actors (Parmentier, 2003). The first three elements focus on justice 
and fall under the transitional justice aspect of the model. The last one focuses on healing 
the wounds of the past and building a peaceful future, which in principle are factors that 
focus on the actor’s actions and perceptions towards each other, for this reason it is dealt 
with in a separate part that focuses on intergroup relations. 
What brings post-conflict measures and intergroup relations as disciplines together in this 
study are firstly, the fact that the conflict at hand, the Kosovo War, is conducted on ethnic 
lines, meaning clearly identifiable group patterns. There are two clear actors, Albanians and 
Serbs, divided on ethnic lines, with observable identity-derived divergences. This in turn 
means that for every policy following this conflict and for every attempt at reconciliation 
and peaceful coexistence in the country, there should be an understanding of the major 
groups in Kosovo, Albanians and Serbs, and the connotations that come with intergroup 
relations. In other terms, to deal with the post-conflict period in Kosovo, one needs to 
understand the conflict itself. To do that, we need to understand the patterns in which it 
surfaced and peaked. When we understand the patterns of the pre, during and post conflict 
we need to build policies that deal with what we found was the diagnosis of the issue. If the 
war in Kosovo happened on intergroup lines, in order to understand the conflict and its 
following resolution and reconciliation process, we still need to understand the ties and the 
effects of the two groups precisely on intergroup relations. The second reason that justifies 
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choosing these two pillars is that after conducting the primary literature review, I sought to 
bring a new approach to the reconciliation process in Kosovo. 
In order to set a blueprint for understanding reconciliation, and the most important factors 
in its constitution that are relevant for Kosovo’s case too, the first part of the literature 
review of this thesis discusses how the transitional justice discourse and its discussion of 
acknowledgment and accountability for the conflictual past in a post-conflict society relate 
to the case of Kosovo. The second part of this look on the relevant literature focuses on the 
discussion of intergroup relations with an eye on the Albanian-Serb intergroup plan in 
Kosovo, and what are the important factors of post-conflict reconciliation that directly 
effect this intergroup equation. In order to do this, this part of the chapter combines the core 
elements of reconciliation with what would be important and effective in the shaping and 
changing of intergroup relations. 
 
1.1. Transitional Justice 
 
The typical political argument would claim that clashing interests bring conflicts as groups 
fighting for the same resources in zero-sum games naturally ‘fight’ for those resources with 
other actors. Human nature and the instrumentalisation along divergences between groups 
on the hand of power holders make for strong pushes towards radicalization and hostility 
(Anderson, 2006). When those differences are based on racial, ethnic, national, religious or 
other collective-trait lines the conflicts that arise are much more difficult to settle and solve. 
Societies seem to not be able to overcome differences and ill memories of each other that 
may have happened a long time ago or may even be made up (Bar Tal, 2007, p. 7). A 
possible approach to this might be the one deeming it impossible for two former conflicting 
actors to co-exist peacefully in the future considering the memory of war, the security 
dilemma being always present and the following discrimination or ill-treatment of the 
losers. Yet that has not always been the case. There have been ethnically driven or tribal 
wars all over the world but the sides have been able to overcome differences and set their 
differences in more political and diplomatic channels than those of direct fight. This change 
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of behavior teaches that people can shift their perception of the other and can learn to 
coexist if aided by policies directly targeting these divergences.  
Scholars and experts claim that violent conflicts have distinct components that during the 
conflict can become independent (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and “contribute to the escalation 
or continuation of violence even after the initial cause has become irrelevant” (Deutsch, 
1973 as cited in; Hewstone M. e., 2008, p. 200). That is why the official settlement of a 
violent conflict is just the initial step toward peace. One of the elements for a thorough 
process of reconciliation and a long-term resolution to conflicts is addressing the past 
violence in judicial terms. Transitional justice is defined as “judicial and non-judicial 
measures implemented in order to redress legacies of human rights abuses, such measures 
include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds 
of institutional reforms” (ICTJ).3 
All policy choices of post-conflict measures regarding justice involve answers to two key 
questions: whether to remember or forgive the abuses and whether or not to impose 
sanctions on the individuals who are (co-)responsible for these abuses (Huyse, 1995, p. 2). 
So the two most important aspects of the way we deal with what happened in a conflict are 
in turn acknowledgment and accountability (Huyse, 1995, p. 2).  
 
1.1.1. Accountability or Criminal Prosecution 
 
There are two ways to pursue accountability of what happened in the conflictual past and 
they differ in levels of strength. The first one stands for an outright criminal prosecution of 
the perpetrators and the second lustration, or “disqualification of the former elites, of the 
agents of the secret police and their informers, of civil servants” (Huyse, 1995, p. 4). 
i) Prosecution & Lustration 
Prosecution and lustration as cited above are both ways to pursue a process of 
accountability by holding to the laws and conducting legally binding measures. From now 
on this paper refers to both as criminal prosecution.  
                                                          
3 https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (2018) 
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Criminal prosecution may vary from a process including just political elites and staff to a 
wider one which would be inclusive of rebels, civilians and external actors. The reality that 
transitional governments face the issue of undertaking prosecution against leaders of the old 
regime or their state apparatus regarding past crimes preserves the questionability of 
prosecution as a whole. Scholars argue that “the prosecution of figures of the past is the 
best way to draw the line between the old and the new (Kritz, 1995, p. 21)” and that it helps 
create the legitimacy of the new authorities and differentiate between them and the old 
regime while leading the way for the creation of the ‘new’.  
Mary Albon writes that in the transitional period following a violent conflict there is a high 
likelihood of prosecution process because a) the crimes committed in such conflicts are 
worse in the eyes of all parties and b) because such conflicts bring a sudden shift and not a 
gradual transition, thus the drive parties have for ‘setting things straight’ is more vivid 
(1992, p. 46). Another factor which is often positively related to a prosecution process is 
that of economic conditions: if a country is economically in transition, a total break with the 
past elites and perpetrators would fix the responsibilities and accelerate the process (Albon, 
1992, p. 46). A valid example of this would be the ex-communist countries where trials 
against the past, economically oppressing elite accelerated the process of re-division of 
property and the passage to market economy after the economic reforms (Albon, 1992, p. 
47). 
Scholars and expert advocates of prosecution have two main arguments in their defense. 
Firstly, they claim “punishing the perpetrators of the old regime advances the cause of 
building or reconstructing a morally just order” (Kritz, 1995, p. 339). The supporters of 
prosecution argue that there is a moral need for ‘justice to be done’. They argue that the 
regime following the one during the conflict has the ethical and moral obligation to work 
on the improvement of the situation of the victims, bee it economic, political or social 
(Huyse, 2013, p. 9).  
The second reason is that it is argued that prosecutions seem a strong form of support 
towards democratic rule (Kritz, 1995, p. 27). There is the belief that for democracy to be 
legitimate in the eyes of the people whatever past crime there is it must be “investigated 
and punished, there can be no real growth of trust, no “implanting” of democratic norms in 
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the society at large, and therefore no genuine consolidation of democracy” (Whitehead, 
1996, p. 84). Still, the ghosts of the past cannot be chased endlessly. The people and the 
government handling the justice process has to let go at a point. To elaborate on how 
prosecution pushes towards a morally and legally righteous order and how it affects the 
attempts for democracy, it is helpful to see what the literature and precedent cases show as 
its pros and cons. 
Prosecution, as a “sort of ritual cleansing process, paves the way for a moral and political 
renaissance” (Kritz, 1995, p. 339). A symbolic example of this process can be seen in the 
typical attempts of destroying the symbols and the monuments of the past in countries that 
have just started a recovery process from a conflict or a painful past, like the destruction of 
dictators’ statues in former communist dictatorships. So the argument builds on the idea 
that just like the monuments are disturbing for the people who have suffered the 
consequences of the old conflict thus demolishing them would serve to calm the tensioned 
waters, punishing and expelling the perpetrators of past crimes would succeed in doing the 
same but on a bigger scale. Prosecution thus, is seen as the definite the solution to an injury, 
cutting a limb that is poisoned to help the whole body recover.  
What could be said about prosecution in political terms is that the adjudication and 
punishment of the fanatics and members of past systems would help consolidate the current 
governmental power (Reychler & Paffenholz, 2001, p. 324). Novel and inexperienced 
governments are be granted a shield against the old order and are provided a real 
opportunity for growth. A reluctance in adjudicating past atrocities may cause a loss of trust 
and legitimacy that the government owns, in the eyes of its people (Huyse, 1995, p. 57). 
Another important factor that lends the need for criminal prosecution conducted by superior 
and legitimate bodies is that if the prosecution is not undertaken in governmental ways, the 
need to have justice encourages individuals to seek alternative ways to achieve it. As a 
consequence, there comes a threat of “vigilante justice with hasty executions or “wild” 
screening of political personnel, where journalists and judges may be instigated as well” 
(Huyse, 1995, p. 56).  
However, prosecution might face different issues too. The first and most concerning issue 
is that of jurisdiction. If the crimes that undergo prosecution regard solely the past, then 
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who are the people that are going to be prosecuted? Should it be just the political elite or 
their assistants too? What kinds of act should be prosecuted? Should it be just for the 
violations of human rights or should it extend to corruption, economic mismanagement or 
discrimination on economic terms? There are no clear answers to these questions and that is 
the problem at the core. There is no magical measure of who to prosecute and for what to 
prosecute (Benomar, 1993).  
All the people that have been working in the preceding administration may look like 
criminals in the eyes of the victims of that regime. However, two issues arise regarding 
their adjudication. Firstly what they did may have not been a crime at the time the action 
was committed. Legally this would translate into not being held accountable for those 
actions. For instance, if they were to be considered traitors in the previous regime in case 
they did not abide to order and requests of their positions or put more simply: if they were 
soldiers or policemen that were to abide to the orders from above, would they be held 
accountable for the crimes they were ordered to commit? Secondly if the regime was long 
lasting and totalitarian there is a possibility that people did not know that their actions 
would be considered crimes or they did not know of better alternatives (Offe, 1992, p. 202). 
Both these issues can compromise the process. 
If all the people in question regarding purely political actions like ideologies, were to be 
tried not only would the process be costly, considering it would leave the country without 
the class of people who were most probably trained and educated to have jobs in the field 
with their knowledge and experience to run state affairs, but it would also affect the society 
as people would look to each other in distrust and hold the same approach towards each 
other they have had in the past (Albon, 1992, p. 46). Thus it just turn into an extension of 
the way relations between these groups were in the past. 
Another counter argument on how prosecution would affect new democracies and the re-
building or newly-building relations between groups suggests that what a democracy needs 
least is unending trials showing lackluster performances and the bleeding system to 
potential attackers. This may aggravate the situation as it may show an open opportunity to 
groups who still think they have a chance to power. Prosecution is seen as “...necessary to 
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assert the supremacy of democratic values and norms and to encourage the public to believe 
in them” (Huntington, 1995, p. 213).  
The chief arguments of those who oppose prosecutions in regard to the relation between 
democracy and rule of law are that firstly prosecutions are futile because evil people will 
always do evil things, thus they are unpredictable and no solution can be definitive and, 
secondly, that prosecutions can damage more than help a novel, fragile democracy that is 
just inheriting a chaotic setting. Trials after such social traumas are generally just show 
trials and that they don’t fit the idea of democracy but they rather are manifestations of the 
victor’s justice. The claims are that maybe it is better to leave everything behind and not 
talk about it, even if people may not be able to forget what happened, silence may lessen 
the pain (Kritz, 1995). 
Kosovo’s yet to establish structures that aim to deal only with war crimes committed in its 
territory. Its being a new state on one hand would require for the state to cut all ties with the 
past and move forward, and on the other would mean that this process could potentially be 
too complex and destructive for the institutions. Even though it has been aided by 
international bodies in order to continue on this track, the reluctance of punishing the 
political class heavily linked to punishable activity during the conflict, the lack of proper 
structures in terms of law and enforcement, and the volatile ethnic situation in the region 
have contributed to the stagnant state of this aspect of transitional justice in Kosovo.  
 
1.1.2. Acknowledgment of the past  
 
There are three levels of institutional change that deal with the acknowledgement of the 
past: 
i) Amnesty 
By definition amnesty “means that the punishability of certain acts is removed; amnesty 
thus abrogates crime and punishment; it can be used to foreclose prosecutions, but also to 
cancel the sanctions that have already been imposed” (Huyse, 1995, p. 57). Amnesty can 
vary in coverage in terms of acts and in terms of perpetrators. It can be a pardoning of the 
14 
 
crimes that have been committed during the conflict in totality or partially. Also, it may be 
pardoning of the ‘loser’ side or a general amnesty that covers whatever event took place 
during the conflict.  
Amnesty relates to both accountability and acknowledging of the past, however the 
difference stands in the fact that acknowledgment deals with the past by bringing it to light 
and starting a process of forgiving. Amnesty is the way to deal with the events of the past 
by forgiving them, an act that might be a self-pardoning or a deal in negotiations. This 
process is more legal than social that is why, despite it being verbally and in-principis an 
antonym to prosecution, it is possible to discuss it as a non-adjudicating measure too. 
ii) Truth Commissions  
Acknowledging the past comes through different dimensions: truth seeking, compensation, 
and rehabilitation. As psychology teaches, societies, like individuals, need to deal with their 
past in order to build a future (Flournoy & Pan, 2002, p. 111). Past traumas that are not 
dealt with and are covered in order to get forgotten do not improve the situation of the one 
who suffered the trauma, they just leave it dormant until a next explosion, or they just 
condition its whole life, making the construction of a better future very difficult on their 
part (Flournoy & Pan, 2002, p. 111). The reconciliation process requires both parties to 
listen to each other, forgive each other and work for a mutually beneficial and peaceful 
future (Davies & Kaufman, 2002, p. 162). Truth seeking is what is defined as amnesty but 
not amnesia. This is what makes the core of the so-called truth commissions because it 
focuses on researching what happened and attempting to write an ‘objective’ narrative of 
the past.  
The first goal of truth commissions is to investigate the truth of the past and not to hold 
trials. It makes sure that the collective memory has them engraved and that all the sides to a 
story matter (Reychler & Paffenholz, 2001, p. 323). The important aspect of exploring the 
past is that general knowledge of what happened is not enough and is not deemed as such in 
most of the post-conflict cases. An official recognition of the damage is needed for both the 
sides to settle. As Nagel (1994) quoted by Huyse (1995, p. 52) explains “It’s what happens 
and can only happen to knowledge when it becomes officially sanctioned, when it is made 
part of the public cognitive scene”.  
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What are the pros and the cons of going with the route of acknowledgment rather than that 
of accountability? In all cases of transition, history has been controversial. Even if the past 
power-holder may be ousted people with their mindset will still be existing, they still will 
have their old defenders which will deny the evil acts they are accused of and will try to 
claim that the acts were perpetrated by others. Giving an, as far as it is possible, unbiased 
account of the events and acknowledging what happened is as important as holding fair 
trials. As J. Zalaquett (1990) quoted by Huyse argues: “...leaders should never forget that 
the lack of political pressure to put these issues on the agenda does not mean that they are 
not boiling underground, waiting to erupt” (Huyse, 1995, p. 56). 
As much as truth acknowledgement in forms of truth commissions brings back the memory 
of war and help to keep it relevant, it is possible for people to live that experience as a 
second trauma (Hayner, 2001, p. 19). Continuously reminding individuals of the traumas 
they went through would inevitably push towards a re-activation of the sense of revenge 
(Bar Tal, 2007, p. 1441). Psychologists argue that “such ‘cleansing’ experiences are not to 
be conducted unless in strictly controlled mediums because they can affect the victims for 
the worse” (Hayner, 2001, p. 165).  
So, the key work in the process of acknowledging the truth would be reinterpretation. 
People should not be left with memories of war which constantly remind them they were 
weak, discriminated or abused, as in a one-frame image but rather they should be reminded 
of the dynamics of the conflict as a whole. The roles of victim and perpetrators should not 
be re-assigned to the survivors of a conflict yet they should be not regarded as faceless 
sufferers of the past but they should be still given the possibility to forgive, if they want so, 
to not talk about it again, and to start fresh. The reality of the past cannot be changed but 
the meaning given to it and the perception people who went through it “can be altered by 
gathering and introducing credible account of the events” (Sverrisson, 2006, p. 9). This is 
often left out in the mayhem of trying to remember everything and forcing people to do so 
even though no proof has ever been given of remembering equaling healing (Mendeloff, 
2004, p. 359). 
This process gives the people the possibility to ‘try on’ the role they had reserved for the 
other. It makes both sides perpetrators, showing them the crimes both sides committed and 
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it puts them both in the role of the victim too as it shows the crimes committed against 
them. This reinterpretation can help people break ties with their bias and the memories that 
still hold power onto them. 
iii) Reparation  
Compensation is a middle route between accountability and acknowledgment. Vogelman 
(1993) claims that compensation by the state is a way of acknowledging the past mistakes. 
It does not bring back the dead, the tortured, mutilated and raped people, it does not pay for 
their sufferings and acknowledging this is also important. What compensation stands for is 
that “for the families of victims and survivors, such accounting serves as immediate public 
recognition of their pain and trauma” (Vogelman, 1993, p. 16) . The most widespread 
method of reparation and also the most concrete one is that of monetary compensation. 
Although in most cases a large amount of money to each affected individual is nearly 
impossible, as Vogelman says, “it is still important to provide financial compensation in 
other forms --such as free or subsidized medical and psychological treatment, reduced 
interests on loans for education, home building and the establishment of new businesses” 
(1993, p. 16). He advocates for the eternalization of the past in the society in the shape of 
institutions. Together with the activities of support groups, these “...provide a channel for 
the non-violent expression of pain, frustration and anger...” (Vogelman, 1993, p. 16). 
Departing political legacies leave the country economically ruined with the population on 
both sides to suffer. The poverty, corruption and economic distress after conflicts can cause 
additional harm in the long run. For this reason a properly run process of compensation and 
restitution is needed. What it does is that firstly it enables the victims of the past to manage 
the material aspects of their loss, it means there is an acknowledgment of the pain the 
people were inflicted in the process and lastly it may stop future crimes by imposing a 
financial cost to such crimes to those in power. As it is elaborated further in this thesis, 
reparation shows willingness to recognize the past and that of building a different future 
together.  
In conclusion transitional justice should involve policies that contribute in these directions: 
The truth must be known. It must be complete, official and public. It should cover all the 
human right abuses on every side. The way to do that may vary and that is dependent on the 
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case. The need for the truth is the first step towards reconciliation. The policy should 
represent the will of the people on all sides. That is why the population has to be informed 
regarding each and every step of the policies following conflicts. Scholars argue that even 
if a societal level of forgiving or at least forgetting can be present, individuals still need 
justice because their trauma is not the same with the social trauma (Pejic, 2001). 
The policy must not violate international law related to human rights. It is important that 
each policy is made known to the public and is done for preventing any further damages to 
the people therefore it is supposed to be in line with the international law and customs. Still 
the policy makers have to make sure that it fits the rule and regulations of the international 
community especially when most transitional legal measures are taken under the scrutiny of 
international actors.  
It should include reparative measures. Past suffering and pain cannot be easily compensated 
neither can it be brought back yet the reparative measures aim not at the past but at the 
future. They should be full and effective in helping the victims deal with the new 
difficulties arising after the conflicts.  
The preventive measures should be given priority while it should include punishment and 
clemency. Even though most scholars regard the South African case as a successful case of 
Truth and Reconciliation measures it may be not so, just telling the truth without doing 
much about it does nothing but will worsen the injuries of the victim (Hayner, 2001; Bar 
Tal, 2007). The balance between the three is the most important aspect that may move the 
process forward and towards the reconciliation period. The penalties and the amnesties 
should be taken while considering the context of the conflict, the conditions in which it rose 
and the prospects for the future. 
If we look at Kosovo’s case we see that there is no structure from the past. The secessionist 
character of the conflict means that during the aftermath, there has to be a complete 
construction and reconstruction of state structures needing to deal with accountability and 
acknowledgment of what happened. This brings a need for both because while trialing the 
central figures of the committed crimes among Albanians and Serbs, the destruction of the 
past power equation means that it becomes more difficult to reach for those who worked 
under orders. It becomes difficult for Kosovo to reach the ex-commanders as the conflict 
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ended with two states rather than one unified structure with a far-reaching jurisdiction. It 
also means that for these processes to be carried and to affect the populations which look at 
both the governments rather than only Kosovo, the one they’re directly tied to, both states 
have to undergo changes and to carry out reforms.  
Furthermore, as the power went from Serbs to Albanians, it means that the latter do not 
have the sufficient experience and knowledge of governmental actions. This means that 
they might be even more lacking in some policies and reforms but might not be doing such 
in a voluntary way. Cooperation and the exchange of past and future knowledge through 
channels like truth commissions and education reforms is of vital need. The descriptive 
analysis of this study, in Chapter III focuses on these aspects that define transitional justice, 
in Kosovo. 
 
1.2. Intergroup Reconciliation 
 
What we see up to this point boils down to the idea that in order to settle a conflict for a 
long-term solution, different sets of measures need to be taken even after the conflict has 
been formally settled by truces or agreements. The reason for this is that the fragile post-
conflict peace may be threatened by unresolved past issues or emerging ones. As in 
Kosovo’s case, even if the conflict ended in 2000, the status of the parties emerging from it 
took nearly a decade to settle. A settlement took place in 2008 with the approval of the 
Ahtisaari plan yet long-term processes need to address what is going on within the country 
in terms of past wounds and future plans. 
All these sets of measures mean to deal with this post-conflict period concern different 
types of conflict, the intergroup, intragroup or international ones. Given that this thesis is 
going to focus on an inter-group level, the discussion to proceed concerns exactly what 
these measures mean to intergroup conflicts, how they affect them and what are the 
expected outcomes once they are implemented. In short, what would such measures 
concretely mean for the society that went through conflict?  
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As Tajfel and Turner in their revolutionary work claim, violent intergroup conflicts have 
distinct psychological elements that can affect the conflict as a whole and move it post its 
initial axis (1979). To promote peace and prevent the reigniting of violence, the parties 
have to engage in a psychological process that requires change in people’s well-embedded 
beliefs and their perception and feelings of the outgroup, their ingroup and the relation 
between the two (Bar Tal, 2000, p. 354). This part follows the last R of the TARR model 
cited above, reconciliation and what Nadler & Schnabel (2008) works teach as the elements 
of importance in inter-group reconciliation. It is important to note that the term is also used 
for the process as a whole, in order to not create any confusion.  
The stepping stones of such a process are investigating when and how intergroup contact 
results in improved intergroup relations, how then can people move from hostile views, 
discrimination, racism and other negative outgroup bias to more positive stands and 
approaches? In order for us to answer this question, first we have to define the factors, part 
of this process that we are going to analyze.  
 
1.2.1. Social Identity 
 
How do we define a group in a society? How do we divide people in different groups? How 
do we know what people in a group think of the other? Social psychology has tried to 
answer these questions. Researchers such as Tajfel, Allport and Sherif have been the 
pioneers in the fields of social identity and intergroup relations. The definition and 
sculpting of groups within a society most certainly derives from how the individuals feel 
about it. So it is not us as observers who can decide which part of the society is a group and 
which part of it is the other (Sherif, 1966, p. 2) as we have seen many issues have 
historically risen from the categorization into groups of a certain population by outer actors 
(i.e the division of borders in Africa by European countries). To avoid miss-categorization, 
social psychologists have come to the agreement that individuals are the ones to fit 
themselves into such labels (Sherif, 1966, p. 7). Sherif argues that any unit of people poor 
or rich, small or large, powerful or ordinary has some sense of common struggle (1966, p. 
2). The important feature that characterizes self-identity though is the fact that the sense of 
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identity is not innate. It emerges and reshapes itself when people are shaping that unit. 
Therefore there is a two-way effect between individuals and group: individuals shape the 
group identity with their individual traits while the group identity shapes the individuals 
with the collective characteristics it has borrowed from them (Sherif, 1966). At minimum, a 
group has been defined as “two or more persons who are in some way socially or 
psychologically interdependent: for the satisfaction of needs, attainment of goals or 
consensual validation of attitudes and values. It is considered that such interdependence 
leads to cooperative social interaction, communication, mutual attraction and influence 
between individuals” (Turner, 1999, p. 6). They construct identities which may be 
internally exclusive such as religion or race but may not be thoroughly so when they are 
‘products’ of mixtures such as children of multiracial couples.  
How does social psychology define social identity? Tajfel argues that social identity is “the 
part of individuals’ self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership 
of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to 
that membership” (1981, p. 255). Social identity as stated is a feature that affects one’s 
actions and puts them in a similar channel with the group. Sherif argues that: “Whenever 
individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually with another group 
or its members in terms of their group identifications we have an instance of intergroup 
behavior” (1966, p. 12). By this definition, what are regarded as intergroup relations then, 
are the collective or individual relations constructed between individuals belonging to one 
group and the members of the other group. If we base our understanding of the actions 
between groups on these givens we can claim that what we see as relations between groups 
is the relation between people themselves blurred by a veil of collectivism and average 
reaction within the group itself rather than some abstract term lifted from reality that 
defines a non-living entity. Consequently this means that if two groups are deemed to be 
hostile towards each other, this hostility does not happen out of some unexplainable 
phenomenon, it is simply an elongation of the emotions and rationale within the groups’ 
units: the individuals.  
This brings us to the main point of this research: if we need to affect the intergroup 
relations, we need to affect the individuals’ emotions, beliefs and behavior. As Kelman 
argues (1988, p. 16), this happens on a trifold system of relations, that of common interests, 
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of shared roles and the last that of internalized identities and values. So this social identity 
provides the context for understanding how ingroup favoritism, or seeing the others whom 
one associates with under a more positive light, can influence the development of negative 
perceptions of others to the point of dehumanization of outgroup members. Negative 
perceptions and emotions associated with dehumanization of the outgroup are likely to be 
quite strong if members of the ingroup have been on the receiving end of oppression and 
mass trauma. All the individuals in a group are affected by each other and the group 
umbrella in a symbiotic relationship. 
Sherif again argues that “All human groupings generate goals that are revealed through the 
strivings of their identified members. Their scope and character are affected by the 
organizational structure of the grouping, its political orientation, and its human, material 
and technological resources” (Sherif, 1966, p. 3). The problems that arise from such 
identifications are that the division of people into groups makes them more biased against 
the outer group which may result in negative perceptions and attitudes towards them. This 
negativity expresses itself in behavioral models such as bias, prejudice and discrimination.  
According to Oskamp (2000, p. 3) intergroup prejudice and discrimination factors can be 
divided into four levels:  
“Genetic and evolutionary, societal, organizational such as laws, norms and 
regulations that maintain the power of dominant groups over subordinate 
ones, mechanisms of social influence operating in group and interpersonal 
interactions: influence from mass media, educational system and the structure 
and functioning of work organizations and personal differences in 
susceptibility to prejudiced attitudes and behaviors and in acceptance of 
specific intergroup attitudes.” 
This thesis takes into account the last three factors: those that can be changed and affected 
by the actions of the outer group directly or indirectly. This is in result of the view Sherif 
offers claiming that the real or imagined relations between groups are dependent on each 
group’s compatibility or incompatibility between its goals and the design of other people 
meaning that as a group moves towards its goals, the moves are accompanied by 
cooperativeness or jealousy, mutual support or resentment, liking or disliking, compromise 
or opposition to the other depending on the outer group’s stand on their achievements 
(Sherif, 1966, p. 3).  
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The two main premises of social identity are that, one, individuals organize their 
understandings of objects, events and people on the basis of categorical distinctions. This 
categorization has a tendency to increase perceived similarities among in-category 
members and emphasize on the differences between the categories. Secondly this 
categorization in groups leads to a ‘we-they’ distinction with increased attraction and 
positive bias towards the ingroup and increasing distrust, stereotyping and negative bias 
towards the outgroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005, p. 238; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Individuals have the tendency to be ethnically centered and in accordance, the starting point 
for intergroup discrimination, prejudice and distrust is “a cognitive representation of a 
social situation in which a particular categorical distinction is highly salient” (Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2014, p. 257). The salience of group differences can create distrust that may seed 
and sustain bias. The keywords in this process are prejudice, discrimination, distrust and 
hate. If these are the conditions a society may be found in before a conflict, what would be 
the situation after a violent streak of events that has increased animosity, hate, distrust and 
vengeful feelings between groups? What can be done for cases when groups’ hostility 
towards each other has increased to boiling points and have caused conflicts? Can their 
relation be mended or at least improved?  
Individuals over-estimate ingroup positivity while focusing on the negative perceptions of 
the outgroup. When paired with a recent conflict this cognitive process brings out hate, 
prejudice, discrimination and distrust towards the outer group. That is why the whole goal 
of a reconciliation process at various levels is to turn these phenomena into positively 
charged ones. What reconciliation promotes is intergroup forgiveness and a re-evaluation of 
the past against built-up hate, building trust against distrust, contact and empathy against 
prejudice and stereotyping, and lastly respect against discrimination. Achieving this though 
is the hardest part of the post-conflict policies yet it is vital. 
The reason why establishing the relationship between individual and group, or putting 
identity as a factor is because while the perfect solution would be to address the past on 
individual level justice or treatment, oftentimes it is not only technically impossible but it 
also doesn’t allow for more. That comes because of the reasons explained above, if the 
events are channeled in group terms then dealing with them should come in the same way 
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and also because it is important to establish the relationship between individual and group 
for us to further the study on their relations.  
1.2.2. Empathy/Respect  
 
One of the major blocks of constructing better intergroup relations is the destruction of 
stereotypes and prejudice. Others tend to be seen as deficient in moral virtue, dishonest, 
unfriendly or warlike. They are seen as different, the ‘abnormal’ ones, the problematic 
ones, the inhumane and selfish party (Janoff Bulman & Werther, 2008, p. 155). They are 
distrusted in a perceptual distortion that does not seek for evidence, it exists and it 
reinforces itself as new events just add to the existent prejudice. The party sees itself as 
morally right in its actions while the others are hostile, aggressive and immoral (Janoff 
Bulman & Werther, 2008, p. 155). A process of disrespecting and dehumanizing the other 
is carried on before, during and after the conflict by the members of the group. In these 
conditions a conflict becomes a war between the good and the evil. This moves the theme 
of a conflict form specific to a very general one which distances itself from the actors; it 
becomes unreachable to the direct actors (Janoff Bulman & Werther, 2008, p. 156). It also 
attributes to a spiral of conflict as it feeds the cycle of “I’m fighting my enemy because 
they are evil” beliefs which would make one perceive them as more evil at the end of the 
conflict and call for a repetition of the event. Whatever intervention is planned to deal with 
this issue should focus on reducing perceived threats and anxiety, promote empathy 
perspective taking and respect. While reducing the perceived threat helps the groups in 
feeling more secure, a direct effect on the security issue, the main interest pushing 
individuals towards conflicts, empathy and respect would facilitate and promote 
reconciliation as they would show a group the other group’s perspective (Janoff Bulman & 
Werther, 2008, p. 159). 
Allport’s contact theory (1979) later developed by Pettigrew & Tropp elaborates on this 
front offering a possibility to overcome prejudice and discrimination. He claims that “under 
suitable conditions direct interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways to reduce 
prejudice between majority and minority group members” ( as cited in Pettigrew & Tropp, 
2006, p. 755). Consequently, if a person has the opportunity to see the competing narrative 
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and view, discrimination and stereotyping tend to diminish (Whitley & Kite, 2009, p. 21). 
The conditions that Allport (1979) claims as necessary for the social contact to result in 
positive changes are: equal status at the time of the interaction, existence of common goals, 
the need for intergroup cooperation and the support of authorities (as cited in Whitley & 
Kite, 2009, p. 29). What the process described in the first part of this chapter aims to 
achieve is securing these conditions. 
The contact should encourage friendly, helpful, egalitarian attitudes and condemn ingroup-
outgroup comparisons. This is however unthinkable in a conflictual environment where 
state and structural discrimination most probably were the push toward the conflict to begin 
with. In dealing with inter-state relations Fearon argues that sides of an interaction are not 
sure of each other and do not trust each other because there is misinformation and security 
concerns (1995) This can be applied to individual or group level relations too. People are 
sure of their own intentions and actions but not about the others’. Even small mistakes in 
sending the message may bring opposite results. In a medium where trust, communication 
and empathy is missing, expecting actors to interact in safe terms would be too much. Thus 
Allport’s theory is not enough to deal with prejudice and stereotyping yet it is at least a 
start. To be more effective it should be paired with communication on equal pre-contact 
conditions.  
The strategies that could achieve this would be intergroup dialogue, workshops and truth 
commissions. These would provide people examples of ‘good behaviour’ from the 
outgroup members as individuals from different groups would be put on the same team to 
work together and this ‘reatribution’ of roles would serve as a process of re-categorization 
from different, potentially competing groups to one group (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2014, p. 
25) (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993, p. 7). 
1.2.3. Trust  
 
Hewstone (2004) emphasizes trust as one of the stepping blocks in the reconciliation 
process. He claims that as long periods of fighting generate hate between groups and make 
it impossible for trust to exist between them (Hewstone, et al., 2004, p. 211). Trust is 
deemed by psychology as a positive bias that tends to leave a sense of vulnerability 
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perceived (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994 as quoted in; Hewstone, et al., 2004, p. 211). As 
defined by the outgroup bias mentioned above, people deem the outgroup automatically as 
less trustworthy than ingroups. It is easy to comprehend how this makes for an important 
issue in the process of improving relations after conflicts. Higher levels of forgiveness 
could potentially lead to higher levels of trust which in turn would reduce defensiveness 
and competition over victimhood (Noor, et al., 2008, p. 108).  
What would be the right techniques to build trust in terms of transitional justice? Firstly it is 
vital that the willingness is mutual and not a further extension of power. Meaning that, if 
the past equation of strong actor-weak actor is duplicated in the post-conflict process, it 
only further deepens the divergences rather than establishing an equal ground for the 
building of improved relations. Perspective talking would be one of the ways to assure a 
process of rebuilding trust. It would require for all sides to leave their settled positions in 
the conflict and be ready to look at events from the others’ point of view, both the 
perpetrator and victim’s position. Looking back to the conflict literature on how to educate 
about peace
4
, this translates into a working truth commission. It is important to establish the 
relation between the two because it allows us to understand how such a structure causes 
practical change.  
Another way would be compensation. This again is one of the parts of post-conflict 
measures. Compensation would serve as a proof of the willingness of an actor towards the 
process (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003, p. 3). It shows the level of commitment and 
seriousness of an actor and shows the other side a readiness to acknowledge the past 
wrongs. It helps the victim because even though monetary sums cannot change the crimes, 
they can help individuals build better futures, help them get medical treatment or help their 
families, thus achieve a sense of justice to a certain point. It also helps the other side 
because it allows a channel to express the will to make things better and a chance to 
channel the past collective guilt. These are both important elements in intragroup 
psychology.  
                                                          
4 (Hayner, Unspeakable truths, Facing the challenge of truth commissions, 2002); (Bar Tal & Bennink, The nature of 
reconciliation as an outcome and as a process. From conflict resolution to reconciliation., 2004) 
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Apologizing is another way of acknowledging the fault committed in the past which would 
symbolically mean the actor is ready to improve the damaged relationship. This in turn is a 
positive factor that affects trust building because as Kelman argues it enables the actors to 
develop new attitudes integrating them into their own identities (1988, p. 25). 
1.2.4. Intergroup Forgiveness 
 
One of the vital parts of conducting a reconciliation process is to show all the sides of a 
conflict, in this case all groups, that violence does not serve them in the long run (Noor, et 
al., 2008). The process is meant to “bring a change in attitudes, emotions and motivations 
in the major part of the groups” (Bar Tal, Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable 
Conflict, 2007, p. 1435). The major issues to be dealt with regarding past violence then are 
victimization, justification of violence and forgiveness.  
The importance of encouraging intergroup forgiveness stands in the fact that it is the only 
way to assure transformative reconciliation which means that it would push people into 
accepting compensation for past crimes, even if technically they are not equally important 
to someone, and it would also quip these groups to approach future conflicts with less 
violent strategies (Noor, et al., 2008, p. 99). People thus have to shift in mind and heart in 
order for them to improve the situation they are found in. 
What are the post-conflict policies that facilitate forgiveness? The answer to this question 
would depend on what actually prevents people from forgiving the others. Firstly it would 
be the presence of a painful past. Humans do not let go of their negative memories 
especially when they have to coexist with whom they believe inflicted that pain. Secondly, 
the blurred lines between victim and perpetrator and the tendency to focus more on the loss 
the group had rather than the one it inflicted, the so called competitive victimhood. Lastly it 
would be the lack of a single, agreed upon narrative of the events of the past.  
Intergroup forgiveness is defined as a process that involves the decision to learn new 
aspects about the ingroup and the outgroup and to try to explore the medium in the eyes of 
the outgroup with the intention to find closure of what happened in the past and developing 
a more peaceful vision about the future (Noor, et al., 2008, p. 101). This process would 
normally be informed and influenced by the willingness of other ingroup members, which 
27 
 
is the reason post-conflict reconciliatory measures detach from individual level and focus 
more on the groups.  
The appropriate policies to achieve forgiveness then would firstly be setting a common 
narrative of the events in the past which can be achieved with truth commissions and 
prosecutions. Competitive victimhood on the other hand can be addressed with direct inter-
group talks, meetings on one hand and setting memory sites on the other. This way both 
sides would get the chance to see the opposite side’s suffering while owning the right to 
demonstrate theirs too. Northern Ireland with the ‘talk-aboutry’ processes, where parties get 
the opportunity to face each other in equal terms, offers a great example of this approach to 
forgiveness (Noor, et al., 2008, p. 105). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The reason this thesis focuses on these elements for intergroup reconciliation revolve 
around two factors: the first is that they offer an axis of factors that change positively, 
simulating the structural changes of the post-conflict period. Each of them bring important 
elements that the first part of this literature review considers important. For this reason, 
they are subsequently important to assess in the study of Kosovo’s case. The second factor 
is that even though each conflict is different, they retain their similarities. If we can find 
similarities in the dynamics of the conflicts in South Africa, Palestine, Northern Ireland 
with that in Kosovo, then a consideration of what scholars have seen important in those 
case in our case might help too.  
Kosovo is a new state, which means they are establishing new identities or reshaping them 
in accordance to the changing medium. The creation or the strengthening of these identities 
among the two major ethnic groups of Albanians and Serbs requires the mending of their 
relations in terms of trust and forgiveness the most. The current situation is that of broken 
ties and groups living in seclusion of each other. This is felt throughout the country and it is 
felt in the public life of Kosovo too. Theoretically, the measures dealing with justice and 
reconciliation in the country, like the establishment of courts, constitutional change, social 
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activities and steps towards bringing these groups together are expected to have improved 
the relations between them. The following chapters try to shed light on this.  
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2. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Scope of the Research 
 
This study aims to shed light to the question of how Kosovo has conducted the 
reconciliation process up to this point in terms of state level and intergroup level with a 
further look of how the latter reflects individual change too . The research works on a two 
layered analysis on the post-conflict status that aims to answer two major questions: What 
has been done within the post conflict spectrum of activities? What is the perception or 
approach towards the conflict, the outgroup, and the reconciliation process per se among 
the population in light of the process so far? Firstly it offers a descriptive analysis on the 
state-engineered transitional policies and reconciliatory measures, with a focus on the 
policies directly concerning and addressing the people of Kosovo. Secondly it works 
towards bringing an oral account of the response and effect such measures have garnered 
throughout the population, in an attempt to touch upon the national feelings, mindset and 
conscience of the people themselves. 
The research’s independent variable is the reconciliation process which as defined here is: 
a very complex, multilayered process whose purpose and hoped result is shifting from a 
violent, hostile past to a commonly built and improved future (Davies & Kaufman, 2002, p. 
162). Its most important aspect is that it stands for a long term improvement of relations 
and not an immediate solution. The elements of the reconciliation process expand in three 
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sets, the first is the settlement of the conflict; the second set is that of transitional justice: 
adjudication, truth telling, reparation, the third set deals with the process of rebuilding the 
relationships between the actors: apology- forgiveness, education reform, building trust 
(Nadler & Schnabel, 2008).  
My dependent variable is positive impact in intergroup relations which I operationalize as 
follows: changes among individual adults towards the acceptance of the new reality in 
which different ethnic groups live together in equal conditions. The elements that are used 
to measure the change are borrowed from Kelman’s model of intergroup reconciliation and 
Nadler & Shnabel’s idea of socioemotional reconciliation: identity (any change between the 
old and new), responsibility or guilt share, empathy for the outgroup, trust towards the 
outgroup and forgiveness of the outgroup. By looking at these elements, this study is 
expected to measure the change in attitude of the groups (Albanians & Serbs) towards each 
other in this post-conflict society. These elements are chosen because, as the literature 
suggests and as has been explained before in this thesis, they are targeted by the post-
conflict measures we tried to look into and because they are positioned in an axis of change 
that shows the society moving from the settlement to the reconciliation.  
This research therefore implements a macro and micro levels of analysis. Thus, the 
complexity of the research requires observing the following unit of analysis: at the macro 
level, legal, and governmental structures and at micro level: individual adults. The macro 
level analysis is conducted on the basis of the previous chapter which encapsulated the 
legal, political, structural steps towards reconciliation as a process. This part only discusses 
whether it has or has not addressed intergroup clashes and how that ties to the societal level 
change. 
 
2.2. Research Design 
 
2.2.1. Type of Research & Criteria 
 
The present research implements a case study methodology. More concretely this study is a 
Type 2 multiple-case (embedded) design. The main reasoning behind the research is the 
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interest in Kosovo as a post-conflict society with internal and external attempts and 
strategies towards reconciliation and a peaceful coexistence. But this research, to 
understand Kosovo as a whole, focuses on two most similar cases within it to conduct the 
inductions: Peje/Pec and Gjakove/Dakovica.  
Firstly, the reason for choosing to study Kosovo as a case stems from my background ties 
to it and the desire to understand the case. Considering my political background the interest 
in Kosovo was furthered by the potential it presents as a similar case to other post-conflict 
societies and the lacking that the current body of work presented, mentioned above. Identity 
based territorial issues showcased in Kosovo are present in the Palestinian conflict too, as 
mentioned by Nadler, Malloy and Fisher (2008). Its interethnic conflict characteristics are 
found in Bosnia too, a similar case within the same region. Its post-secession ethnic conflict 
characteristics can be found in the Kurdish case too, even though Kosovo has finalized a 
settlement, similar patterns present. For this reason, this case presents the potential of 
contribution in both theoretical knowledge and understanding of different practical 
measures.  
Kosovo thus presents itself as case of these important characteristics:  
- A post-conflict society whose main clash was over territory and identity based 
divergences. 
- A case that present interventions focusing on structural reforms that aim at building 
a national identity under which ethnic differences can be overcome and a peaceful 
coexisting future. This is the emphasis of the founding block of Kosovo as an 
independent state, the Ahtisaari plan that stands for the creation of a self-governing 
democratic entity with the focus on multiculturalism & the protection of minorities. 
Considering the resource and time limitations, in order to understand if or how the 
structures and the intergroup relations across Kosovo I chose two smaller units of analysis 
to focus the study on. I chose Gjakove and Peje as a representative sample with useful 
variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest of this study. The criteria engaged in this 
selection was characteristics that would have a role in shaping intergroup relation and the 
perceptions each side have of each other. The elements are under consideration of the 
32 
 
literature on ethnic conflict (Gellner, 2008) and that of social psychology (Pettigrew, 1998) 
as a reflection of the characteristics of the case and the focus of the study.  
The first factor taken in consideration is the ethnic composition of the cases. In order to 
look at a case that would not be an outlier in a distribution graphic, I saw it rational to 
choose two cases that would share the general demographic lines of Kosovo countrywide. It 
is important to choose a case that presents noticeable presence of both groups because as 
the social contact theory mentioned in the literature part of this thesis claims, positive social 
contact might have an effect on the way groups perceive and act towards each other. Both 
Peje and Gjakove as communes present the same characteristics with Kosovo on the 
country-level in terms of ethnic composition, they’re both Albanian majority entities with 
an average presence of Serb minority. The percentage of Serb minority in Kosovo is around 
1,5 % per the 2011 census
5
, however it was boycotted by a part of the Serb population 
which means it might be a misrepresented number. It is also a number that reflects the 
striking majority living in the north, areas which are under special administration units tied 
to Serbia. This means that in the general distribution in Kosovo the rate is lower. Gjakove 
and Peje as the most recently reported both have around 300-400 reported ethnic Serbs 
under their administrations (ASK, 2012)
6
. The second factor is their geographical location. 
As the conditions in Kosovo stand, the North is still a debated issue. The status of 
Mitrovica as the border between Kosovo and Serbia makes for the commune to be an 
extreme case compared to the rest of the country. For this reason I opted for two south-
western communes. The third factor taken into consideration is the level for involvement 
during the fights in 1999. The level of violence expressed in systematic violence, number of 
casualties and displaced was chosen as the parameter of this factor. Both Peje and Gjakove 
exhibit a high level of violence during the conflict, both were targets of systematic rape, 
killings and ethnic cleansing. Peje had a population of around 180 000 habitants, of which 
85% Albanian and 15% Serb. The casualties (manually gathered from the reports of the 
massacres and systematic killings in the city and the bordering villages) amounts to 1300 – 
1500 victims, there are reports of mass rape and the police, paramilitary and military 
                                                          
5 Index Mundi (2018) www.indexmundi.com/Kosovo/  
6 ASK’s results of the 2011 census conducted in Kosovo accessed in 2018 http://ask.rks-gov.net/  
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expelled around 90% of the population (Human Rights Watch, 2001)
7
 (Humanitarian Law 
Center, 2018). Gjakove had a population of 131 000 habitants, of which 93% Albanian and 
7% Serb. The casualties amount to 1500 – 2000 victims with reports of mass rape and 
executions. The amount of the displaced in the commune is up to 75% (Human Rights 
Watch, 2001; Humanitarian Law Center, 2018)
8
. Additionally both cases had involvement 
of the local population in both sides (Human Rights Watch, 2001). 
The factor that would make for the difference between the communes is their absorption or 
involvement of their structures in post-conflict policies. This was conducted after the 
descriptive analysis on Kosovo and how it has scored in post-conflict measures. Looking at 
how the central government’s attempts at such policies spread among the communes, and 
on how the communes scored brought Peje and Gjakove as the best choices for such an 
analysis. While they presented similar patterns in the other factors, they differed in the level 
they had absorbed and dealt with post-conflict measures, Peje had scored comparatively 
better in it.  
Thus the choice of Peje and Gjakove is a non-random case selection done in order to 
observe the possible effect of reconciliatory measures in a post-conflict society when 
variables present themselves constant in a most-similar cases pattern, after selecting them 
from the pool of Kosovo’s communes for their representability and relativity in 
understanding the bigger picture of country-wide situation in Kosovo.  
The followed sampling method for semi-structures interviews was that of a snowball 
technique for both cities. Three individuals from which the sample started were selected, to 
have the possibility to reach the young, middle aged and elderly. Both ethnic groups of 
interest, Albanians and Serbs, and both genders were represented in the starting point to try 
to reach a more diverse sample. Although this method jeopardizes the representability 
factor the sample has for the overall population, I tried to reach more throughout the 
proposed interviewees. This method was also employed because considering the sensitivity 
of the topic at hand, it would be difficult to randomly find people in a different country and 
                                                          
7 UNHCR, Human Rights Watch and OSCE reports remain the base of the official number of victims in the Kosovo war. 
The numbers may alter because of the practice of re-opening graves, destroying IDs or burning bodies that took place 
during the conflict.  
8 http://www.hlc-rdc.org/db/kkp_en/index.html  
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ask them about their painful past. An amount of trust was needed for the conducting the 
interviews.  
 
2.2.2. Methodology of Data Collection  
 
The data for the descriptive analysis of post-conflict measures in Kosovo was conducted in 
the span of a year under the consideration of the extensive literature review done 
beforehand. It involves the data collectible of the case up until 2017. The data from the 
interviews was collected in November 2017. For these reasons, they might not be reflective 
of the most recent developments in the country however, the time span of the study allows 
to look into conflict, pre-independence and a nearly decade long post-independence period 
which are sufficient to assess transitional justice and reconciliation in the country. 
The analysis conducted in this thesis is two-levelled: descriptive for Kosovo on country-
level and qualitative for the interviews conducted in Peje and Gjakove. For this reason the 
data collection was different. The data are collected through the use of the following: 1) 
semi – structured interviews 2) discourse analysis.  
The data from the interviews is collected and analyzed based on notes taken during the 
interviews as interviewees were strictly against getting recorded. As there were directive 
questions before hand, the important declarations that revolved around the five factors 
sought in the interview were noted. The interviews were conducted in mother tongue for 
the Albanian interviewees and in English or Serbian/English translation for Serbian 
interviewees. While I am aware that this brings an unequal dimension in the understanding 
of content and the feelings expressed, I tried to access people as much as possible. 
My collection of secondary data relies on the systematization of information provided by: 
official data from state sources like UNHCR, HRW or OSCE and Kosovar central and local 
governmental structures. 
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2.2.3. Methodology of Case Analysis  
 
In order to answer my research question, the relationship between post-conflict measures 
and successful conflict transformation, the following systematic steps has been performed: 
The analysis started with the conceptualization of reconciliatory measures, a concept that 
was developed and borrowed mainly from Bar-Tal, intergroup relations, as explored by 
Sharif & Pettigrew and the concepts of identity, conflict and transitional justice.  
Consequently, Kosovo’s case is analyzed by the following steps:  
1. Analyze the changes occurred in governmental structures  
2. Observe of the relationship between transitional justice and the social 
transformation reaching intergroup relations through discussion of the interviews. 
Burton (1969) claims that in contrast to the negotiation of a political settlement, a process 
of conflict resolution goes beyond a realist view of national interests. It dives into what 
causes the conflict and lies at the root of the issue, especially focusing on the needs for 
identity, security, recognition, autonomy, and justice exposed to the threat of more 
powerful actors. As Kelman argues “he process and outcome of negotiations must be 
consistent with the requirement for ultimate reconciliation” (1998, p. 37) which would 
translate into a need for peace settlement, engraved into the local and historical context of 
the case itself.  
 For this reason, in order to better understand whether there is an actual resolution and 
reconciliation process in Kosovo rather than the simple settlement, the parameters chosen 
for the study are there to offer a view on how the perception, behavior and approach is 
expected to change in such a deep process rather than the mere structural changes that were 
described above.  
As Nadler, Malloy and Fisher (2008) write in length, this goes from the study of identity 
and the association with it, to how it affects the distribution of guilt and the living of shame 
and blame, to establishing ‘alternative’ truths and acknowledge them in the road towards 
putting the self in the others’ shoes or simply empathy, to then forgiving with the help or 
not of reparations and cultural and structural changes and lastly moving towards a peaceful 
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coexistence. So the last chapter that focuses on the interviews that were conducted, deals 
with the attempt to understand the mindset, perception and behavior of the ethnic groups in 
Kosovo and how they fit in this axis of change from conflict to resolution.  
2.3. Limitations of the Methodology 
 
The followed method is one of strictly psychological and conflict policies discussion. It 
does not in any way conduct purely political or economic analysis, thus it may be that the 
results found by the interviews are not reflective of the theories regarding economic 
transformation or political reforms after a conflict. It being a descriptive analysis followed 
by open-ended interviews, analyzed in terms of themes and commonalities means that the 
understanding of the same material by different people may be differing thus open to 
discussion. The study’s qualitative focus was vital, considering the objective to reach the 
actual beliefs and perceptions of the Kosovo population, however it leaves the research 
open to discussion on the sample choice and its representativeness. The sampling method 
might have led to reaching a sample of similar subjects that might have affected the overall 
results of this study. The type of topic the interviews treat makes it difficult for random 
sampling to be carried out. This is because it requires an area of familiarity or some type of 
facilitating to be able to direct such sensitive and to a degree retrospectively intrusive 
questions. This would be solved with study replications with other samples. 
The choice of Peje and Gjakove for the interviews was done to increase the 
representativeness of the sample however it is expected that it might not be such of the 
cases of Mitrovica as the divided northern commune or of the Serb majority special 
administrative entities part of the Community of Serb Municipalities. This limits the results 
to the remaining territory of Kosovo. 
My background and knowledge of the case and having lived in the area yet with a sufficient 
distance to not be directly affected by it might be helping the understanding of the case 
better than in cases where this prior experience is not present. Yet, this leaves my study 
subject to prior bias. However, the expectation I had for the results of the study were 
different from the results that I collected, this might help clear the doubts of how my prior 
bias might have had affected the way in which I observed the case.  
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3. RECONCILIATION, A LONG ROAD AHEAD 
 
 
 
The reconciliation process is based on establishing mechanisms that would prove 
effective in long term and would provide the subject groups peaceful dialogue and provide 
the actors the opportunity to build trust. This thesis focuses on the relations between 
communities, how Albanians and Serbs of Kosovo deal with the aftermath of the conflict 
and the knot that was created with the declaration of independence so it is important to 
address the process by its effects on the community, the people of Kosovo. 
 In order to take the long journey of the reconciliation process and produce positive results 
among the affected, there are certain conditions that ought to be placed and that would 
include a backward-looking element – including agreements on basic truths, reparations 
and the exercise of some form of transitional justice, or “dealing with the past”, as well as a 
forward-looking element – the changing of relationships towards the building of a sense of 
trust between communities, including a basic agreement on the norms and values by which 
the state should operate as thoroughly discussed in the literature chapter of this thesis. We 
look at these one by one. 
 
3.1. Social and Political Background Of the Kosovo War and the Following 
Reconciliatory Measures 
 
In order to depict a clearer image of the situation in Kosovo, one needs to shed light to the 
conditions that led the country to the armed conflict in 1999, especially the social ones 
considering the nature of this study. This chapter takes the focus lens back in time in order 
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to take a look at how the conflict was built up, how the events up to Kosovo’s 
independence unfolded and what has been done ever since, all this under the light of the 
literature discussed in the previous chapter. The chapter is thus divided in three parts 
developing each of these sub-topics.  
 
3.1.1. Post-Imperialist Nuances, Nationalism, Political Instrumentalism 
 
Since its inclusion in 1913 Kosovo was nothing more than a little province inside Serbia, 
one of the republics that was a member of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 
situation though was not seen as pleasant by any of the sides. As the wide range of 
literature on the topic argues, this stems from two factors: pre-existing nationalist discourse, 
earlier present in the region and fueled by post-imperial narratives of the Ottoman period 
and a politically instrumentalized and inflamed socio-economic inequality. These facts, 
coupled with ambitions of the Serbian political class, were going to sparkle civil clashes 
and later drive the area into a full-fledged war. This part of the chapter is going to dive 
deeper into both these factors, trying to shed light on what lines the two groups saw each 
other as different and as of clashing interests, ultimately seeking solution in annihilating the 
other side. I deem this analysis a good foundation of a possible and plausible argument on 
the reasons that drove the groups into war, and that keep affecting them to this day because 
if we are able to understand where the root of the conflict lies, what were the lines in which 
it developed and how the actors perceived each other, this would help in the understanding 
of the current situation and how they have reflected in the group relations of Albanians and 
Serbs in Kosovo. 
Today’s Kosovo is a small country of a nearly 10.887 km2, with a population of about 2 
million, 92% of which are ethnic Albanians, 1,5% Serbs, and the other 3% is distributed 
among Bosnians, Turks and RAE community (Roma, Askali, Egyptian) (IndexMundi, 
2018)
9
. However, its small size has undergone a turbulent history under different emperors 
starting from Roman, Byzantine, Bulgarian, Serb, and up to the Ottoman Empire. Despite 
this seemingly homogenous amalgam of people, Kosovo has always been at unrest as a 
                                                          
9 https://www.indexmundi.com/kosovo/demographics_profile.html (2018) 
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result of its position in two nationalist narratives that while different in names and 
attributes, both focus their claims and mythical past on the area. Even though a merely 
primordial approach towards interethnic relations would be wrong and overly simplistic, 
considering the nature of this study that focuses on perceptions, feelings and human 
emotions under social identity considerations, the basis of primordial ethnic approach, it is 
an aspect that we ought to include.  
Kosovo has always had a crucial role for the competing narratives of Albanian and Serb 
nationalism. Backed by strong lobbying and powerful state agendas with sometimes 
‘proxy’ interests by Albania and Serbia, the nationalist discourse over Kosovo has turned 
into a self-sufficient fight, still ongoing. As Peral writes there are two important competing 
nationalist projects on the history and claims over Kosovo: “One project recalls for Kosovo 
as Serbian territory, ‘Greater Serbia project‘, and the other brings upon an Albanian option 
to Kosovo territory which at times can be considered as ‘Greater Albanian project’ and in 
other periods as a project of Kosovo’s self- determination from Serbia implying, mostly, 
Albanian population” (Peral, 2008, p. 41). Both projects are based in competing arguments 
over key elements of Kosovo such as: origin of its population, the Kosovo Battle, the 
religious-cultural legacy, and the legal frameworks that have been implemented in Kosovo, 
especially since 1974 Yugoslav Constitution onwards. 
Albanian claims base on the mostly glorified and heavily influenced by the bolshevism of 
the communist regime history that sees Albanians’ origin from the Illyrian civilization, as 
an indigenous people to the territory, belonging to the tribe of Dardans (Malcolm, 1998). 
While Serbian perspective evokes the great migrations of Slavs into the territory in 7th 
century A.C, and its ruling during the 12th and 13th century as Serbian Kingdom (Bieber & 
Daskalovski, 2003). Therefore, while Kosovo Albanians and the wider Albanian narrative 
on which it backs on, judge Serbs as occupiers, Serbs accuse them as falsifiers of history 
and heavily doubt the reliability of the ties between the modern Albanian population and 
that of Illyrians (Waller, Drezov, & Gökay, 2001). 
The Illyrian descendance theory finds support in many of the early nationalist writers of the 
Albanian renaissance, noticeably that of Pashko Vasa and the Frasheri Brothers. 
Identification, as who were the Albanians at the end of nineteen century, is offered by 
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Pashko Vasa in ―The truth on Albania and Albanians (Vasa, 1879) claiming all the 
inhabitants of the later called regions of-Shkoder, Janina, Monastir and Kosovo. From an 
Albanian perspective, Kosovo signifies the main and last fight of Albanians for the 
recovery of the ancient land of the Dardania and thus a re-creation of their ancient 
kingdom. In this sense, the origin of Kosovo issue goes back to the London Conference of 
1913 when Albania was recognized as national state. However, Serbia, Montenegro and 
Greece were granted half of its territories as Serbia was allowed to keep possession of 
Kosovo which it had occupied during the Balkan Wars. Kosovo then started to represent 
the victimization of Albanian people by its neighbors, especially Serbia/Yugoslavia, for 
Albanians, as it embraces the feelings of protecting part of their “stolen land”. In addition, 
the never-ending lobbying and supportive attitude that the state of Albania offered to the 
Albanians in Kosovo and the technical support right before the war in 1999 bear testimony 
to how important Kosovo is for the Albanian identity and Albanian nationalist discourse. 
Even the Kosovo Liberation Army was led by Albanian officers and the weapons heavily 
and illegally sneaked from the Albanian border. 
From the Serbian perspective however, the history is quite different. By origin, Serbs 
belong to Slav ethnicity. After about a century they settled the area and self-named as 
Croats and Serbs joined by Christianity as a common feature besides ethnicity. Serbia 
continued to expand until it gained a medieval reputation by the hand of King Stephen 
Dusan. The area of his empire included Macedonia, Northern Greece, Montenegro, almost 
all Albania (Cox, 2002, p. 21). Serbian dominions were not integrated however, and the 
dynasty kept the existing order in the territories conquered in order to legitimize its role, so 
in fact these Byzantine territories were never part of Serbia as Dusan and the successive 
historical consciousness of Serbia claimed they were. Anzulovic (1999, p. 79) affirms that 
“[t]here was no Serbian state at all, and the principal mark of Serbian national identity was 
membership in the Serbian Orthodox Church”. Since 1557, Serbian Orthodox Church was 
the only Serbian institution authorized by the Ottoman Porte. It was then when the Serbian 
patriarchate of Pec (nowadays Kosovo, Peje) was established embracing all territories from 
Slovakia to the Adriatic in same millet (Banac, 1988, p. 134). Nonetheless, this institution 
did not mean territorial and political control, which contradicts the current claims of the 
Serb state. 
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The Kosovo battle constitutes the boiling point for these two narratives. The nationalist 
Serbian discourse made of this battle a strong component of the Serbian national identity. 
However, this battle included not only Serbs but also Albanians, Vlachos, and Bulgarians in 
a common cause as a “Christian coalition” against the Ottomans. Slobodan Milošević 
exploited this myth in his political statement to the Serbs in Kosovo in 1989 or even in 
1996 he remarked, “Every nation has its one love that warms its heart. For Serbia it is 
Kosovo.” (Carmichael, 2003, p. 63). For the Albanians on the other hand, this battle is a 
sign of the state promoted nationalist view of the resistance of the Albanians against the 
Ottoman enemy. Thus, it constitutes a stone in the foundations of the testimony of the 
Albanian identity since the middle ages. The Kosovo Battle is thus, a myth that has defined 
both national identities of Serbian and Albanian populations in Kosovo.  
The other aspect of this problem is that the political class, majorly on the Serbian side, 
considering that Albanian side lacked structures, fed, incited and instrumentalized these 
clashing narratives for their own ambitions and interests, turning differences and myths into 
structural discrimination and violence. The idea of Great Serbia was present since early 
periods and it was continuous. In this sense, it is possible to argue that the national self-
definition of Serbia has been always related to its governing of other territories, the claims 
of which were sometimes based on myths. As documented, among the known and shocking 
expansionists plans, there is the one of Vasa Cubrilovic. He presented to the royal 
government his first memorandum called “The Expulsion of the Arnauts”, on the 17th of 
March of 1937. In such a document Cubrilovic expressly declared the need for the 
expulsion of the Albanian community, of colonizing Albanians by expelling them out of 
their territories or burning down Albanian villages (Cubrilovic, 1937)
10
. In the same way, 
Ivo Andric (Nobel laurate of literature of 1961) presented a project to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia in 1939 in which he proposes the occupation of Albanian 
territories, with special reference to the deportation and assimilation of the ethnic Albanians 
in Kosovo. The presence of such documents testifies the claim that beyond simple militarist 
strategies and aims, Kosovo was in the center of much deeper social, cultural and political 
claims on part of the Serbian nationalist ideology.  
                                                          
10 (Kosovo Information Center, 1993) Serbia Colonization and Ethnic Cleansing: Documents and Evidence 
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On the other side, the Albanian identity and ‘claims’ had found support and 
acknowledgement within the Ottoman Empire for a longer period. The Treaty of San 
Stefano, as a result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, conferred Albania territories to 
Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia, and particularly the Kosovo territory to Serbia (Gawrich, 
2006, pp. 38-46). The Albanian (from Kosovo and Albania) tribal leaders and local figures 
gathered in response to this decision creating the League of Prizren which would be the 
first acknowledged institution of the Albanian population. Despite failing to address the 
objectives of unification, it succeeded in planting the bases and the forces of the 
Albanianism. The League of Prizren can be considered as the first articulation of a united 
Albania idea. In this view of a unified Great Albania project, Kosovo was considered 
therefore, a key element not only for hosting the League of Prizren but also for expressing 
the defense of what Albanians considered their own and unfairly divided territory. 
Albanian nationalism had the objective of mobilizing their people in the same emotional 
imprint that religion in the Ottoman Empire was able to offer. As Jelavich & Jelavich 
(1977)argue, Albanian nationalists needed to replace religion as a grouping category 
because Albania contained three different religions – Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox – 
therefore, they sought another element that would unify these differences created since the 
conquest of Albanian land by the Ottomans. The element to do this would be language, thus 
creating a wide opening for the presence of Kosovo in the general Albanian nationalist 
discourse.  
Keeping these factors under consideration, it is possible that this balance of powers 
inherited by the continuous invasions of the area might have affected the way these groups 
see and perceive themselves and each other. As the most similar case in terms of post-
colonialist territory – identity ties that of Palestine as Kelman explains (1998, p. 25) teaches 
that the ties to the land, legitimacy and being on the right side are factors that affect a 
group’s idea of what’s just and what’s theirs. If both see themselves as legitimate it means 
the problems lies deeper, in their identity, in their self-assessed roles which need to be 
addressed by a proper reconciliatory process.  
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3.1.2. Political Background  
 
Besides this historical analysis of the nationalist dimension before the Kosovo conflict, 
translating it into actual political actions and events and tracing its effects on the political 
elite is a more effective way of studying the divergences between the parties and the 
resulting clash. It is important to see the actor’s political status before the conflict as it 
gives a sight of how the relationship between the groups themselves changed in accordance 
to the political developments, like the different status within Yugoslav borders, the 
development of the actors that would ‘represent’ each side further on and how the situation 
spiraled into an armed conflict. 
Kosovo and Serbia have both been federal units of former Yugoslavia together with other 
six units. According to the constitution of 1974, each federal unit had autonomous status 
and none could interfere in the constitutional order of the other. However, because Kosovo 
and Vojvodina had been linked to Serbia as autonomous provinces, Serbia attempted to use 
this mandate to overturn the federal status of Kosovo in 1989, following the disintegration 
of Former Yugoslavia, aiming to prevent Kosovo from exercising the right to self-
determination after the collapse of the former federal state. The public claims for such a 
move had historical bases as discussed above, though the undertone claims Kosovar 
Albanians not seldom cite rest on the motives of having control over Kosovo territory as a 
rich land in mineral resources. 
Serbia annulled the right to self-determination of Kosovo in 1989 and derogated the 
Constitution of Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. By this procedure, Serbia 
instituted her own rule, thus, committing an unconstitutional act before the Constitution of 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The SFRY granted almost equal rights to 
republics (Serbia) and Autonomous Provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo). According to the 
SFRY constitution, both provinces were part of Serbia, however, they both enjoyed special 
considerations which granted them a high level of autonomy over their territory and the 
veto power at the federal decision-making level. 
In response to Serbian intervention, Albanians reacted by declaring independence. The 
demands for independence of Kosovo by its people were based in the rights they enjoyed 
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since their self- determination was recognized by SRFY constitution of 1974 and therefore 
expressed in the Kosovo constitution of 1974. The legitimacy of their self-determination is 
based on three major arguments: 1) equality with the other Republics of SRFY, therefore 
with Serbia 2) Independence in decision making processes 3) Territorial Integrity.  
One of the debates around the legitimacy of Kosovo’s independence while referring to the 
SRFY constitution is the equality between republics and autonomous provinces of Former 
Yugoslavia. The republics and autonomous provinces are equal at federal level as they all 
have a status of the federal units of former Yugoslavia with equal powers. In this sense, if 
republics and autonomous provinces are equal under the rule of law, both have same right 
of independence, as it was experienced by Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia & 
Herzegovina. Accordingly, Albanians have been considered a nationality and not a nation 
in the former Yugoslavia in spite of the fact that they were the third largest nation after 
Serbs and Croats. However, the 1974 constitution also specified that nations and 
nationalities were equal. This legal contradiction allowed Serbia and Kosovo to claim their 
constitutional rights in the way it suited them most.  
The disintegration of former Yugoslavia was supposed to allow its eight federal units to 
decide their future by themselves. However, Serbia impeded Kosovo to take such an option 
and by violating the Constitution of former Yugoslavia (1974) which reads that one federal 
unit could not revoke the status of another federal unit. In 1987 Slobodan Milosevic, 
appealing to Serbian national sentiment, committed itself to reasserting Serbian control 
over Kosovo. This goal was followed by forceful and unilateral changes in the constitution 
of Kosovo in March 1989 despite the opposition from Albanians of Kosovo. On 26 
February, as the opposition continued, the SFRY/Serbia authorities introduced the state of 
emergency. On 23 March 1989, the provincial assembly of Kosovo gathered and Serbia 
took the de jure control over of Kosovo's police, judiciary, domestic & foreign polices as 
well as the right to make future constitutional changes without the consent of the provinces 
leaving what had been Kosovo’s autonomy now lifeless. 
The peaceful resistance of people of Kosovo was led by Democratic League of Kosovo 
(LDK), as an active peaceful movement for freedom, independence and democracy 
operating in Kosovo and Diasporas during 1989-1999. The political project of LDK was to 
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fulfill the will of people for self-determination and an independent state of Kosovo but it 
was only after declarations of independence that two other now former units of SRFY, 
Croatia and Slovenia, had conducted the political requests from Kosovo’s political elite 
aimed for independence, mimicking the aforementioned. Further, in October 11, 1991 it 
adopted the joint political declaration with all Albanian political parties in Yugoslavia to 
define the question of Albanians of Yugoslavia in case of disintegration of the state. So the 
two strategies in which they engaged in and planned were international mobilization and 
building of a statehood. 
It is important to understand the political conditions because in this way we can understand 
whether each party had access to power or not, be it political or armed. We can see that 
there is a situation of political asymmetry in Kosovo’s case which means that the groups’ 
access to power was not the same. Albanians and Serbs did not have the same political 
access, making it difficult for the Albanian population to be represented in state structures. 
Another factor rising from this asymmetry is that the group’s perception of themselves is 
also on the same lines. As we further see in the war period, the overwhelming difference in 
military power, which ironically was also a result of Kosovo’s participation in 
strengthening Yugoslav structures, would translate not only in direct asymmetry of 
casualties but it also shaped how each group perceived the perpetrator or the victim. 
 
3.1.3. The War Period 
 
As noted, the history of conflict between the two groups dates back to the beginning of the 
20
th
 century with shifting lines between groups and shifting interests and associations 
along. However, the armed conflict would start by the end of 1997 to peak in 1999. It was 
initially an internal conflict within the borders of ex-Yugoslavia internationalized to then 
turn into a full-fledged international war with third parties becoming part of the fight. As 
literature also demonstrates, with the increasing number of actors, causalities and conflict 
complexity increased too (Fearon & Wendt, 2002).  
The main conflicting parties of this time period are the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and Serbia (SFRY/Serbia), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the 
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Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). These main parties are noticeably differentiated by their 
ethnic identities which are the result of the two competing nationalist discourses in Kosovo 
during the periods considered in this research. During this period, the role of Kosovo Serbs 
is limited; their relevance is only related to the support they offered to the actions of Serbia. 
Nevertheless, they are still considered as primary party as they have a direct interest in the 
outcome of the Kosovo conflict.  
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia (SFRY/Serbia) were both parties 
in conflict, although Serbia and Milosevic were de facto the key players for this, because 
although Kosovo was federal part of ex-Yugoslavia and autonomous province Serbia, it 
was Serbia which unconstitutionally revoked the status of Kosovo. And for this and other 
reasons that I proceed to explain, I refer to this party only as Serbia. The conflict in Kosovo 
was mainly a conflict between Serbia and the Kosovo Army (KA). During the pre-conflict 
period or the years that sparked it 1979-1989, Serbia enjoyed the diplomatic and military 
advantage conferred for being the leader of SRFY and illegitimately used the Yugoslavian 
state potentials. SFRY weaponry used by Serbia came from contribution of all nations it 
fought against, including Kosovo. Among the Albanians, the two main actors of this period 
were the Democratic League of Kosovo and the Kosovo Liberation Army which emerged 
near the end of this period, in 1997.  
LDK or the Democratic League of Kosovo is a civil movement formed in 1989 by a group 
of prominent Albanian intellectuals. Under Rugova’s (future president of Kosovo) 
leadership, LDK aimed for freedom, independence and democracy. LDK would become 
extremely popular and have the chances to play a double role in Kosovo, as the movement 
for independence of Kosovo and as the legitimate representative of an underground 
Kosovar state. KLA, The Kosovo Liberation Army, was an armed group that emerged 
publicly in the Kosovo’s conflict in a press conference in Switzerland in the summer of 
1997. It was formed by Albanians in Kosovo and the diaspora. The KLA came as a reaction 
to the lack of results of peaceful movement of LDK, especially after the Dayton Summit 
did not recognize Kosovo among the affected states. Some analysts say that KLA was just a 
product of wartime improvisations, seizing the opportunity of weapons flow into Kosovo 
after the economic collapse in Albania (Waller, Drezov, & Gökay, 2001). Regardless of the 
veracity of such conclusion, the fact is that KLA did manage to be seen internationally as 
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expressing and representing the will of an ample spectrum of Kosovo Albanians. In this 
sense, the KLA became a double-face actor being both a key negotiator at the Rambouillet 
talks under Hashim Thaçi’s leadership, removing practically the relevance of Rugova and 
the LDK peaceful movement, and a key factor for the escalation of the conflict. 
By 1997 the Serbian police forces increased the hostility of their actions but in a guerrilla 
manner, challenging LDK’s non-violence strategy, to later have it completely undone by 
1998 (Bieber & Daskalovski, 2003, p. 44). As the KLA spread wider into the territory of 
Kosovo three major figures emerged, Zahir Pajaziti (Llap area), Adem Jashari (Prekaz) and 
Sali Çekaj (Deçan) creating an alarming threat for the Serbian side. In retaliation, in 
February-March of 1998, Serbia entered the KLA dominated city of Drenica in search of 
the KLA leaders. However, the Serbian side did not stop with the leaders, their actions were 
mostly directed to civilians. They managed to destroy the whole region of Prekaz and harm 
civilians living there; three villages were destroyed, 80 people were killed wiping out the 
whole Jashari clan, including 24 women and children (OSCE, 1999). According to Bieber 
& Daskalovski (2003, p. 44) these actions of Serbia transformed the KLA to a sort of 
‘national liberation army’ in the eyes of the Albanian population and the international 
actors too. 
Up to this date, the events taking place in Kosovo were initiated by the Serbian police and 
para-military but the Drenica massacre gave way to the Serbian army for it to enter the 
territory. While the KLA stood on the border of 20,000 guerrilla fighters, the Serbian army 
and police summed up to 100,000 troops. The obvious asymmetry in fighting powers would 
translate into a staggering difference in casualties for both sides. Kosovo would witness 
several mass-executions targeting children, men of fighting power and mass-rape. 
Following the Drenica massacre, there was the Izbica massacre in Skenderaj, where all 
victims were women and elderly, the Rezalle massacre again in Skenderaj, the Dubrave 
Confinement Institution (high security prison for politically imprisoned individuals) 
massacre where the Serbian party had armed the Serbian prisoners against the Albanian 
side, the Krushe e Madhe massacre targeting all civilians, the Rugove massacre, the 
Studime massacre which mounted to 140 civilian causalities and the massacre of Meje in 
Gjakove, which counted around 400 male victims among whom a high number of 
secondary school students (OSCE, 1999).  
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By 15th January, 1999, the escalation of the conflict reached the peak level. The 
Observatory Mission of OSCE would find the bodies of 45 civilians massacred in Racak 
(Ignatieff, 2001, p. 35) which would bring attention to the mass murders that were being 
committed. The territory had been abandoned by families which in some cases were 
directly encouraged, or forced, by the Serbian police to leave the country, in a clear attempt 
at ethnic cleansing and population replacement. As settlements built for only Serbian 
families in the southern region increased, the push towards Albanians to flee the country 
had reached its peak. By this date more than 800,000 Kosovo Albanians out of 1.5 million 
had fled to the neighboring Albania while the level of violence had reached the boiling 
point. The peak of the war (February 98’- May 99’) accounts for 274 mass 
killings/massacres, in which more than 4,000 unarmed civilians have been executed while 
the burnings and bombings continued in full force.  
In an attempt to stop the fighting, the international actors brought both sides to the table. 
Through the NATO push, a meeting of both the Serb and the Albanian side finally took 
place in Rambouillet and its second session in Paris in the period 6-23 February and 15-18 
March 1999. It was the time when the crisis escalated in dramatic dimensions in Kosovo 
with a bloody war threatening to spillover beyond its territory, as bombings and military 
helicopters flew over the Albanian border cities and Kosovo Albanians had found shelter in 
both Albania and Macedonia. The Conference aimed at stopping the war and Serbian 
atrocities against the Albanians and eventually placing Kosovo under NATO protectorate. 
It was a proposal for the autonomy of Kosovo, for its democratic rule and for the 
establishment of a judicial system. It failed due to the reluctance of Milosevic to sign the 
agreement and Serbia’s biggest ally, Russia’s rejection. The rejection on Serbia’s part 
alarmed international actors that had already been through a similar war just two years ago 
in Bosnia. In an attempt to stop another similar case, the international decision makers led 
by the UK and the US opened the door to international humanitarian intervention of NATO 
on 24 March 1999. After three months of war or NATO bombings against them, Serbia 
finally agreed to peace expressed by signing the Kumanovo agreement for the full 
withdrawal of the forces from Kosovo and gave support to the UN Security Council 
resolution 1244. Since this resolution, Kosovo was placed under a NATO and UN 
protectorate and was administered by UNMIK for 9 years, until 17th February 2008 when 
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the Kosovo assembly declared independence with the support of the United States and 
other Western allies. 
As the conflict ended, numerous cities in Kosovo had changed in terms of demographics. 
The massacres carried by the Yugoslav army had decreased the number of ethnic Albanians 
expelled from Kosovo by Serbs, March to June 1999 reached 863,000 and the estimated 
number of ethnic Albanians internally displaced within Kosovo, as of mid-May 1999 hit 
590,000. The ethnic Albanians remaining in southern Serbia reached 70,000 - 80,000 while 
the number of ethnic Serbs still in Kosovo was around 700-800 (UNHCR, 2001). These 
issues remain to be solved by the policies and attempts of any improvements of relations or 
solutions carried by both sides after the conflict. 
 
3.2. Settlement and Institutionalization of Peace 
 
 Despite the Balkans being a troubled region with numerous bloody conflicts taking place 
in a short period of time, not much has been said or done in this regard in all these cases. As 
Todorova says, many times, the issues have been related to primordial explanations of 
ancient hatreds or simple grievances resulting in armed conflicts, just like the terms 
Balkanization which has come to be a pejorative connotation of a political process 
(Todorova, 1994) without considering the variety factors like distance from power, political 
instrumentalisation of ethnic divergences, economic disparity and structured discrimination 
on ethnic lines, which brought the peninsula to the events that shaped its past and are 
shaping its present. Simultaneously, vaguely efficient has been done in addressing the way 
these countries had to deal with their war injuries and to learn to coexist in peace as it’s 
seen in Bosnia, Kosovo or special regions like Presheve and Vojvodina. Why is it important 
for Kosovo to do that? As the issue of reconstruction and post-conflict policies can go back 
to the democratic discourse, it is important to note the steps from the ceasing of fighting to 
the establishment of peace and its institutionalization, meaning building structures that are 
directly concerned with its conditions. Some argue it is a matter of “non-lethal coexistence 
– a negative peace characterized by the absence of violence – as sufficient” (Mendeloff, 
2004, p. 365). Others claim that the establishment of deeper relations based on forgiveness 
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(Tutu, 1999) and mutual trust (Bar Tal & Bennink, 2004, p. 15) are requisites to post-
conflict policies. To understand what route a post-conflict society is to choose, we look at 
how they frame their talks beforehand. When we look at the Kosovo case we see that what 
Kosovo and Serbia are trying to do after their violent war is to normalize life in the 
respective countries and deal with issue that have been left from the past (Burema, 2012, p. 
8). We see this from how they are managing their political life and the post- conflict period. 
They are two countries that claim to be democratic and base their political existence on 
democratic means. This means that they are working on two levels: “a set of fair procedures 
for peacefully handling the issues that divide a society (the political and social structures of 
governance) and a set of working relationships between the groups involved” (Bloomfield, 
Barnes, & Huyse, 2003, p. 10). Given that the ethnic groups we are interested in are tied to 
these sets of behavior & policies, it is possible to see the reflection of these state policies in 
them. For a society that experienced conflict, going back to those issues and the relations 
between them is tough and requires a ‘healing’ process coined as reconciliation. 
The background of this conflict shows inequality of power among Serbs and Albanians and 
the fact that this political inequality translated into social inequality that later gave rise to 
the Albanian movement. So, post-conflict state, with a new power-holder, has to show not 
only its legitimacy but also the ability to secede from a state and lead in democratic ways. 
Additionally, with torn social bonds between Serbs and Albanians, securing trust between 
the groups when they are still on shaky grounds after the conflict and assuring that newer 
sparks don’t happen and the conflict doesn’t rekindle is very important for the 
governments. The Albanians only look towards the Kosovo government however the Serb 
minority, even though in a non-equal manner, looks at both governments. For this reason, 
both governments should be working on what is the first step towards the settlement of a 
conflict: the termination of the direct fight and a mutual agreement on the basic rules within 
which a multiparty meeting and negotiation takes place. In the attempt to eliminate any 
possible future divergence over what the agreement stands for, the latter should be 
formalized through an officially documented conflict settlement (Burema, 2012). Kosovo 
lacks in this direction. The end to the armed conflict in 1999 came with NATO bombing 
Serbia, which in the broad plan of events might be acceptable for one party as it eliminated 
the danger for the Albanian side, but not for the Serbs that suffered the bombing even in 
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civilian numbers. The only official document following the 20 years long political struggle 
for the status of Kosovo, post-war is what Ahtisaari proposed in his plan. 
As mentioned above, the first time the two parties sat on the table was that of the 
Kumanovo meeting to decide on an armistice. However, even though the Kumanovo 
agreement had been signed and Kosovo had been put under the UN and NATO control, the 
issue had not been settled. Different attempts have been undertaken with the goal of 
resolving the conflict between the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians: the Airlie House 
Conference in July 2000, the Constitutional Framework of Kosovo in 2001 –referring to 
“consociational democracy” –, and the Standards before Status in April 2002, the Seven 
Points plan for Mitrovica in October 2002 & the Decentralization policy. None of these 
attempts touched upon the issue of the final status or were final, thus is not be treated in this 
section.  
In 2004, violence restarted as a group of Serbs followed Albanian children resulting in their 
death. The act brought a wide wave of reactions in an already tense environment. It ended 
with 8 Serbs and 11 Albanians killed and thousands displaced. This served as the saturation 
point for the post - conflict period as it showed that a peace agreement that only settled on 
ending the direct fights like the Kumanovo one or bombing one party to force it to stop the 
advancements into the other’s territory was not enough and that there were no more 
chances to postpone the definition of the destiny of Kosovo. The events of March 2004 
have shown that Albanians and Serbs were not eager to continue living in a limbo. In 
October 2005, Ahtisaari was sent as Special Envoy of UN Secretary General in order to 
address the final status issue for the first time since NATO intervention in 1999. Under his 
lead, representatives of Kosovo and Serbia negotiated in an attempt to find common ground 
and after 14 months of unsuccessful negotiations the process was exhausted. With this array 
of facts, in March of 2007, Ahtisaari proposed to the UNSC the “Comprehensive proposal 
for the Kosovo Status Settlement” or the “Ahtisaari Plan’, that aimed at the creation of an 
independent Kosovo under international supervision. At the same time, the Serbs were to 
be granted enhanced minority rights, including five more municipalities as well as 
protective zones for religious sites.  
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As a theoretically good step towards reconciliation, the core elements of this proposal and 
later the constitution, include measures to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights 
of communities and their members in order to build a multicultural area, very similar to the 
plans on Bosnia Herzegovina. The changes developed with particular focus on Kosovo 
Serbs, through decentralization of the administration, it provides protection of cultural and 
religious heritage, brings measures ensuring legal, economic and security reforms. 
Considering that this paper doesn’t aim looking into the legal and wider constitutional 
frame of the reconciliation or the peace-building measures, it will not get into further detail 
of these changes. 
Supported by an influential section of the international community like NATO members 
and especially the US government, Kosovo moved on to declare its independence on 
February 17, 2008, and after three months, adopted a Constitution, designed on the basis of 
Ahtisaari’s plan. The Constitution follows the concept of civic state and provides for the 
recognition of rights of the individual, together with strong guarantees for the rights of 
communities and particularly the Serb community. In short, the Ahtisaari proposal aims at 
reconciling the differences between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs by providing an 
internationally supervised independence for Kosovo, an independence that would satisfy 
the Albanian majority, while promising the Kosovo Serbs a safe and prosperous future 
within the new state. However, the major problem is that the founding document of Kosovo 
doesn’t use explicit terms but leaves room to interpretations differing on the two sides when 
it was expected to settle the first issue between Serbs and Albanians. Ahtisaari never 
explicitly mentions Kosovo’s independence, contributing into the prolongation of the 
uncertainty between the two parties and endangering the idea of legitimacy and trust to 
state in the eyes of the population.  
In a clear secessionist effect the EU position focuses on “a unilateral recognition of 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence would help to stabilize the domestic situation in 
Kosovo itself. It would create sovereign equality among Kosovo and Serbia, facilitating 
their common integration within the EU” (Coppieters, 2008, p. 99). The results though have 
been very different from the goals set at the beginning. Not only is there an unsolved border 
issue peaking sporadically in the city of Mitrovica or the adjacent region of Presheve with 
Albanian majority, there is also a failure in securing the rights of the new minority post-
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secession. Both of these issues are serious hurdles in the road towards reconciliation 
because they leave territory and population out of reach for both states. 
The ambiguity and the refusal of using the particular terms deciding on Kosovo status led 
into a verbal and legal discussion of what the document stands for, which, coupled with 
political instrumentalisation, falls right into the pre-existent frames of the parties. One 
argues that it supports “its unilateral declaration of independence of 17 February 2008”, 
while the other party stands for the opinion that “it reaffirms that Kosovo is an integral part 
of the territory of the Serbian state” (Burema, 2012, p. 9). These co-existing versions of 
truth have nursed the pre-existing divisions between the communities, leaving parties the 
choice of what to believe. This opinion tends to fall on the dividend lines in this case over 
the ethnic frame of the society. There are considerable regional divergences even within its 
small size in territory and population. While in southern Kosovar state, institutions are 
generally able to exercise their authority without any serious issue or outer intervention, in 
the North the government’s impact, role and institutions are nowhere comparable to the 
Serb’s, even though it is officially Kosovar territory. The Kosovar government officially, 
considering its independence act too, considers Kosovo as part of its territory while the 
Serb community, as shown by the Serb state’s lack of recognition of said independence and 
sovereignty, still regards Kosovo as its own territory. This is a situation that has prevailed 
since 1999, with both parties conducting acts that directly or indirectly brought a change in 
the ethnic composition of the respective areas. The large numbers of people forced to leave 
their homes on both sides, and the resulting resentment of these people is an additional 
hurdle to the reconciliation process. Although the direct fight has stopped and sporadic 
incidents have decreased in frequency Kosovo and Serbia are still on opposite sides 
regarding Mitrovica (North Kosovo) and the way they perceive the future from there is still 
different. 
Besides the conflict settlement issues, these geographical differences translate into another 
issue too. The state apparatus including judiciary operates on different reaches in different 
regions of Kosovo. On institutional terms, the state is efficient in southern Serb-majority 
areas, because the geographical distance between the “mother” Serbia and the group has 
weakened the tie and the population there is strongly aware of the now closed cause. This 
awareness has increased their will and participation in peace-making and pragmatic 
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relations with the Kosovo institutions, as it has also increased the willingness of the 
Albanian governmental officials to bring changes that might be against the will of the 
Albanian majority. The communes of Peje and Gjakove are part of this region too. This 
equation has created a greater potential for reconciliation in the area. However as 
mentioned the degree of commitment to these institutions and state structures is poor in 
Mitrovica (furthest Northern point) and the Serb municipalities suggested by the Ahtisaari 
Plan and established and conjoined with the approval of the Kosovar government as part of 
the negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. 
 
3.3. Adjudication 
 
The three points important in adjudication in the case of Kosovo and Serbia are: 
recognizing victims, punishing perpetrators, and dealing with the disappearances. What is 
important in the process of adjudication is that the courts should be impartial for them to be 
trusted by both sides and they should be recognized by the countries too, it should not be 
regarded as biased by them, it should have the capability of carrying on the punishing and it 
should have credible threat in case of non-compliance (Flournoy & Pan, 2002, p. 112; Gent, 
2013).  
To try to understand the picture of the situation it is important to look at the official data 
from the conflict and compare it with how much has been done to address it. It is to be 
noted that the seceding character of the conflict makes it very difficult to collect the data 
and to organize it. This is because firstly there are different structures to deal with, Kosovo 
is a new state with new institutions while the conflict happened when there weren’t any. 
Secondly, there are still recent discoveries of mass graves, which makes the number of 
casualties on both parties open to further change. 
The recorded data of the conflict and what it caused to Albanians and Serbs is as presented 
in the graphs below with the data provided by the reports of OSCE (1999) (UNHCR - 
OSCE, 2000-2002), HRW (2000) and Humanitarian Law Center index (2018).
11
 
                                                          
11 http://www.hlc-rdc.org/db/kkp_en/index.html 
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Figure 1 – Casualties During the Conflict 
 
Figure 2 – Number of Displaced Persons During Conflict 
12 
Figure 3 – Recorded Presence Under the Outgroup State  
                                                          
12 Serb presence in Mitrovica and the 5 administrative units is not officially recorded as they did not participate in the 
2011 census. It was also boycotted heavily throughout other cities too. 
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The reason we look at these three indicators is because they are the most important factors 
pushing for an adjudication process. Figure 1 would help to understand what the situation 
was during the conflict and how have courts dealt with it, if there has been any process or 
attempt at reparation or return to land from these people and how has the Kosovar state 
managed it. The third is an additional indicator of the return process and of understanding 
whether the current conditions help the reconciliation process the significant presence of 
both groups is required for it. Also, it helps us to understand whether, in our case Serbs in 
Kosovo have seen the conditions sufficiently suitable for a resettlement. This is telling for 
our research because it requires a level of trust in the governmental structures and a level of 
horizontal trust in the Albanian population too. 
The second step to understand the situation is to look at the structures built to deal with this 
process shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 –Transitional Justice Structures 
Transitional Justice Structures for 
Adjudication 
Lifespan Cases 
International Criminal Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia 
1993-2017 7 
The Special War Crimes Chamber 
at Belgrade District Court 
2003 - ongoing 49 
The Kosovo Relocated Specialist 
Judicial Institution 
To be established - 
United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo 
1999-2008 40 
EU Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo 
2010-(expected) 2020 256 
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The first institution to deal with the crimes committed on ethnic lines in Yugoslavia before 
the war in 1999 was the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
established in 1993. At first, this tribunal prosecuted those who had committed crimes 
against Serbian population only breaching the impartiality principle of the court. By the end 
of its mandate, the ICTY has found seven people guilty of war crimes committed in 
Kosovo. In January 2014, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) upheld the conviction of past Serbian Assistant Minister of Interior Vladimir 
Djordjevic for the murder, persecution, and forced deportation of Kosovo Albanians in 
1999, while reducing his sentence from 27 to 18 years. Important names of the Yugoslav 
political elite that are under investigation or have been acquitted in controversial trials 
include Radko Mladic, Vojislav Šešelj and former Yugoslav army general Vladimir 
Lazarevic. 
The Special War Crimes Chamber at Belgrade District Court has delivered seven final 
judgments on war crimes in Kosovo (Amnesty International, 2012, pp. 9-10) 6 trials are 
ongoing, indictments have been issues in 16 cases awaiting trial, and 20 cases are under 
investigation. 
What does this mean for Kosovo and its ethnic-based division? Firstly, it signals that the 
asymmetry of power during the conflict might have continued after it too. As emphasized 
earlier in this study, criminal prosecution is a way to detach the current actors from the past 
and put them into new frames. In order to do this, even though our case at hand is Kosovo 
as a state, both actors, namely Kosovo and Serbia as states should show a degree of 
commitment that would signal to their respective populations beyond and within their 
borders that there is justice on equal terms. They would have to show the population in 
Kosovo and the one in Serbia that they are committed to the process and that they are ready 
to have a shift in roles and conflict-based identity (what role they identify with during the 
conflict). However, Serbia’s performance suggests that it has failed in achieving this. 
The international community has been persistent in their pressure for the Serb state to bring 
former commanders still at large in front of justice by using it as a condition for Serbia’s 
European integration. Firstly, the low number of cases and the slow process shows that one 
party of the conflict is not committed enough to this process. Besides this, the government 
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is putting additional hurdles in the path as the trials have been suspended because of the 
negligence in officiating the prosecutor and there has been no official conviction for the last 
4 years. The adjudication part of transitional justice is meant to provide victims with a 
sense of justice. Given that it is two different states who were parties in the conflict, 
national gatherings or amnesty are difficult to settle this. For this reason, it is necessary to 
have a thorough process from both states so that both groups in Kosovo in our case, and 
Serbia too, could reflect the same behavior. However, this lack of commitment to seeking 
justice is showing the victims of the atrocities that they will never see the wrongs 
committed against them addressed. This weakens the trust they have in them and it reflects 
on how they see the other party. It does not show them that there the chance for them to be 
victims again is low. If the perpetrators are all who speak, no victim can end their silence. 
Secondly, it is difficult to see that this process has had any positive results in changing 
approaches too. Figures who faced their penalty like former army general Lazarevic, former 
deputy prime minister Sainovic, or those who managed to avoid prison, like Šešelj are 
venerated as heroes and are allowed to continue their ultra-nationalist propaganda freely. 
The Serb media itself avoids anything about the ICTY itself and the mentioning of their 
war crimes on official levels. They are oftentimes given wards and titles even by the Prime 
Minister in office, the leading figure in the negotiations with Kosovo, Alexander Vucic 
very strongly signaling Serbia’s position in the process. 
The Kosovo side is more complicated because of the novel institutions and the power 
shifts. Kosovo gains its independence only in 2008. Up to that time, the legal system of the 
country is under the lead and control of UNMIK. UNMIK (United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo) leads the Kosovo court system to prosecute 40 war 
crime cases in a time span of 9 years (1999-2008). After the UNMIK mission left Kosovo, 
EULEX (EU Rule of Law Mission) took the lead so 1187 war crime cases were passed over 
to EULEX. By 2012 EULEX prosecutes 20 cases and is still investigating 76 of them 
(Amnesty International, 2012). The Responsibility for the investigation of war crimes is left 
to the Special Prosecution Office of the Republic of Kosovo (SPRK). 160 incomplete war 
crimes cases, of which 128 cases are under EULEX Special Prosecution Office 
prosecutors’ decision power and 32 under Kosovo Special Prosecution Office prosecutors’ 
(Kosovo EULEX Programme Report 2014). As no new trial or case is investigated, by June 
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2016 EULEX is expected to leave Kosovo but instead, its mandate gets extended twice, 
with a potential end of mandate by June 2020. The European Council cites the mission’s 
need to “support the specialist chambers and the specialist prosecutor’s office” while 
monitoring “selected cases of criminal law” as the areas it focuses in, signaling the 
shortcomings of governmental structures in these areas (European Council, 2018).
13
 
The lack of structures and acknowledged institutions is a serious concern on making the 
court system even weaker given the severely damaged structures, once in Yugoslav elites’ 
hands, already high level of corruption and impunity in Kosovo (Transparency International 
Kosova, 2012) and the shift in power. Adjudication is meant to strengthen the reach and 
position of the incumbent government, however in Kosovo that hasn’t been the case. The 
Albanian politicians of the current government have strong ties to the KLA, losing part of 
their legitimacy in the eyes of the Serb minority. Important names that were acquitted or 
under investigation: the current PM Ramush Haradinaj, Fatmir Limaj, President Hashim 
Thaci, all prominent political figures in Kosovo with the latter being the current President 
of Kosovo. This has not only delegitimized them in the eyes on one party, but their names 
being involved in difficult war crime discussions or latter political problems like corruption 
and money laundering has weakened their position for the Albanian majority too. The 
failure in detaching from the past has only build a circle in which the Kosovar political 
elites move without any change.  
In a very publicly contested decision, Kosovo is set to establish a new court to deal with the 
crimes committed during the war by the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army). The court is 
officially named “The Kosovo Relocated Specialist Judicial Institution”. This court is 
expected to begin working in 2018. It is set to deal with war crimes allegedly committed in 
1999-2000 by members of the Kosovo Liberation Army against ethnic minorities and 
political opponents in the territory of today’s Kosovo. Problems with the legislation behind 
the establishment of the tribunal, the way it is supposed to work and how it reflects on the 
preceding work have surfaced. As Burema claims, “part of the responsibility for inadequate 
transitional justice lies with the international community in general and particularly with 
UNMIK, which carried the primary responsibility for the justice sector for most of the post-
                                                          
13 www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/08/eulex-kosovo-new-role-for-the-eu-rule-of-law-mission/  
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conflict period” (Burema, 2012, p. 15). Both UNMIK and its successor EULEX have been 
regarded as disastrous in protecting witnesses and victims of the war crimes or building a 
precedent of a proper adjudication process in a post-conflict case. They have made the 
process lose the vital importance in the eyes of the people. 
As different examples of ethnic conflict, like the Bosnian war, Palestinian issue or the 
Kurdish issue teach us, one of the strongest indicators of a state’s acknowledgment of 
interethnic issues is the approach to the return process (Rouhana & Bar Tal, 1998). This 
process is the acknowledgment of the right to return to the proper land, house or area, for a 
forcibly displaced group. The importance and relevance lies in the fact that for it to be 
possible, there should be a degree of mutual respect and willingness between groups. The 
perpetrator is supposed to have recognized their wrongdoing and try to amend its behavior 
while for the victim it means that they have gained enough trust in the other group for them 
to return to a place that in the past meant life danger. On both sides, it shows the 
willingness and the degree of work done in the ‘future’ front, or that of building a peaceful 
coexistence.  
The pre-conflict period of 1970-1990, the 1999 conflict and the resurge of violence in the 
March 2004 riots have caused a great issue in terms of displaced groups in Kosovo. As 
shown in Figure 3, approximately 90% of Kosovo’s Albanian population was expelled 
during the period. Even though the Albanian population has built a strong diaspora because 
of this reason, majorly concentrated in Switzerland, Germany, Norway and Sweden, the 
population that found refuge in neighboring countries like Albania and FYROM ha almost 
all returned to their settlement. The issue however stands for the Serb minority. The 
aforementioned causes have built a number of around 228,000 refugees and displaced 
persons of which 17,000 are still not accommodated (UNHCR, 2017). The return rate is 
nowhere comparable to the number. Almost two decades from the conflict both groups 
have built their new lives in their new locations, and are largely banned, legally or socially, 
to return to their previous settlements. Serbs have largely moved into the Northern Serb 
majority settlements or have stayed within Serb territories. 
The utter failure in developing the transitional justice process has left place for the rise of 
complaints on both sides. Both communities are convinced that the crimes and damage 
61 
 
caused to them during the conflict have gone unpunished and need more serious 
engagement. As such, they refuse to look at the events from the other perspective too. 
Neither is willing to acknowledge their own wrongdoings and the significance of the 
other’s suffering and pain meaning that it is not impossible not only for the status to move 
from the status quo, but for the people to evolve from their past selves and identities too. 
They are stuck in the same victim-perpetrator discourse but without being able to channel it 
into the right institutions, without having the justice they seek and increasingly losing their 
faith in their institutions. This means that there is a severely lacking central process of 
adjudication in Kosovo and Serbia, that contributes to the continuation of the uncertain 
situation among ethnic groups. 
 
3.4. Truth Establishment 
Where there is a conflict in the past, what the victims need the most is justice (Pejic, 2001). 
The major problem in this point is that, considering that there is no established truth after 
the conflict, the events of the past are most of the time blurred and filled with propaganda 
from both sides and both parties are still in a phase of de-humanization of the enemy, 
meaning they do not accept their deeds as illegitimate while the other is always seen as the 
‘evil’ and deserves the things done to them (Nadler & Schnabel, 2008). The 
acknowledgment of the past suffering and the establishment of the truth (Pejic, 2001, p. 2; 
Bar-Simon-Tov, 2004, p. 4) are as important to a post-conflict society as justice itself.  
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance counts truth-telling as 
one of conditions that are needed for reconciliation and long-term improvement of relations 
between two former hostile parties (Bloomfield, Barnes, & Huyse, 2003). What a truth and 
reconciliation commission stands for thus is a body of research established to reveal and 
disclose the events of the past in an impartial way (Bloomfield, Barnes, & Huyse, 2003; 
Flournoy & Pan, 2002, p. 1). It should be able to pave a path for the process to take place 
and this can be done by agreeing on a narrative of the past which all parties would accept 
and as a result take responsibility. In this way, the conflict will not be seen as a one-sided 
attack but more like a dynamic chain of events with unclear lines and positions. It is 
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important because as discussed earlier, it not only affects the collective truth or the group 
one but in that way, it affects the individual truth and the approach to it too. 
What we see in the case of Kosovo is that none of the parties of the conflict or of the 
negotiation table have been particularly interested in this type of approach to post-conflict. 
The international and Albanian community has granted a lot more attention and will power 
to state-building and political stability rather than these type of reforms and measures. The 
Serb side on the other hand, has spent a great amount of lobby power and political 
resources on the basic issue of Kosovo being part of Serbia’s territory rather than bringing 
an unbiased account of the suffering of the Kosovo Serbs during the conflict. This mutual 
lack of interest and effort has left both Serbs and Albanians in the Kosovo grieving, distant 
from each other, and displeased with the post-conflict process. 
Looking at precedent cases of wars that were a result of deep social clashes like the one in 
South Africa, it appears it would be very helpful for Kosovo to have established a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) because of differing narratives trying to coexist in 
the post-conflict period (Gibson, 2006; Gobodo-Madikizela, 2002).The deeply rooted 
ethnic divergences have established different mind frames for these two groups, from 
which they look and evaluate events. Both sides have tried the roles of victims and 
perpetrators yet the narrative following the war that both sides are subjected to is focusing 
on them only, dehumanizing and blaming the other. An impartial TRC would help with 
bringing people from both Albanian and Serbian side on equal grounds where they would 
share how not only Albanians were victims during the conflict or how the buildup social 
and economic discrimination to the armed conflict had affected the Albanian community 
too. However, it appears that reality has been different from this.  
The only TRC for Yugoslavia was founded by President Kostunica on March 30, 2001 
amidst heavy opposition. It was created only a few months after a change in the 
government post-war indicating that the new government knew the importance of such a 
step, in order to deal with the criminal nationalist elite of the past which still roamed free. 
The commission was initially composed of fifteen members: twelve men and three women, 
all appointed by the president himself. Considering the still existing heterogeneity in ethnic 
lines prevalent in the country, 4 members were added purely to raise the level of 
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representation. But given that they were the same in ideological, ethnic, and political terms, 
serious concerns over the impartiality of the commission as a whole arose. Two members 
later resigned because of disagreements over the Commission’s composition and mandate; 
one of them resigned due to taking a government post, and one passed away. The 
commission ended its mandate without conducting any activity. 
Despite the attempt, the commission’s work was weakened by several factors. Firstly, 
Yugoslavia had already been divided into different countries by then. This meant different 
states, peoples and narratives to deal with, making it very difficult to operate a commission 
that dealt with crimes committed in three different wars, in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. 
Secondly, the political sphere in Serbia (then namely Serbia and Montenegro) during that 
period was unstable and extremism was on the rise. The Prime Minister Zoran Djindic was 
assassinated in March 2003. The December 2003 elections brought the right-wing party in 
power. The rise of the ultra-nationalist power in the country effectively ended any prospect 
of continuing with truth telling. 
Most importantly, as mentioned at the beginning, Serbia has still not recognized Kosovo as 
an independent entity. This prevents or rather frees the state mechanism from taking 
responsibility of what has been done. People are still relying on the official narrative of the 
war (Ilic, 2004). They regard the NATO bombings of Belgrade only as a war, completely 
ignoring the atrocities committed by the Serbian side and Serbia continues to regard 
Kosovo as part of its territory and national history and Serbs still believe so (Ilic, 2004). So, 
more than the establishment of such a commission, the real advancement would be 
witnessed when the pre-conditions for its creation are fulfilled. That is, the benefits of a 
TRC are not only from what happens during its time, fulfilling these preconditions of 
establishing is beneficial for the reconciliation process too. Kosovo and Serbia have still not 
fulfilled those conditions. 
A concern that stems directly from the research and the establishment of truth is that of the 
disappeared individuals. It has proven to be equally vital to both Serb and Albanian groups. 
Amnesty International registers more than 3000 on the Albanian and approximately 800 on 
the Serb sides, added to the 1900 bodies that were never found, as victims of “enforced 
disappearances and abductions” (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 84). Like the similar case 
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of Bosnia Herzegovina teaches, in Clark’s work, the lack of information on missing relative 
and disappeared persons causes the latter’s families and friends to remain ‘locked in the 
past’ and ‘unable to move on with their lives’ turning so into further hurdles towards 
reconciliation (2010, p. 430). This was heavily hinted by the interviewees in this research 
too. 
Furthermore, the lack of an established truth in Kosovo, brings in the issue of forgiving. If 
the competing ‘truths’ of the Albanians and the Serbs have not been told, have not been 
exposed to the other, and the suffering has not been acknowledged by both parties, the 
animosity they have towards each other cannot be changed. As Nadler and Schnabel (2008) 
suggest, it is impossible to move into a phase where forgiving and learning to walk into a 
co-existential future is achievable when the voice of the victims has not even been heard. 
 
3.5. Constructing Future – Education and Trust 
 
The past-factor is not the only factor in a reconciliation process. It should be an axis that 
ties dealing with the past and building the future. For this reason, one of the most important 
aspects that there is to it is building the broken relations and trust among the parties. The 
conflict in Kosovo might have ended in 1999 in terms of violence but the risk of re-
occurrence rests extremely high for the first 5 years after it ends (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) 
and if nothing is done to address the changing dynamics, then the risk continues to exist. 
Additionally, if the conflict ended by the intervention of a third party as in the case of 
Kosovo, the retreat of that party may translate in a rebirth of the conflict and a new spur of 
violent events (Gent, 2013, p. 75) when the international bodies retreat.  
Education is one of the areas in which these changes can be made (Burema, 2012, p. 4). 
Educating new generations regarding the past is a way of bringing change in the 
perceptions. It can bring the youth to a closer level of contact and can re-shape the 
narrative, pushing for a more objective view and positive change on both sides.  
But the case with Kosovo is that what started as a civil war gave rise to two states. These 
new states have now different governments which are using nation-building policies that 
not only differ from each other but put the other in the center of such politics, and the most 
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prominent place for such policies is schools. Education in Serbia and Kosovo is still either 
lacking or very biased in reporting the events of the past, which can be observed from their 
history curricula. This opens the door to the indoctrination of the new generations with the 
same feelings of the previous one, feeding a machinery of bias and fear which leads to 
polarization and animosity in the long run. Having two different states like Kosovo and 
Serbia with a conflictual past with each other give different and highly politicized books to 
their respective communities translates into a deeper split over the two groups as not only 
they would have lost the direct contact the social psychology focuses so much on, but it 
would also mean that this polarization diminishes the prospective of learning about the past 
and designing a different future generation. Furthermore, both sides have been adamant in 
not accepting the idea of the introduction of the language of the other group in their school 
curricula, making communication and steps including narrative even more difficult thus 
deepening the division and cutting the chances for a common ground. 
The nationalist projects explained in the first part of this chapter are still clearly present in 
the actual curricula. According to a study directed by the Humanitarian Law Center in 
Prishtine, Albanian-language history textbooks in Kosovo write that Kosovo has been 
Albanian territory since the 4th century BC. Additionally, the claims that the Albanians are 
direct descendants of the ancient Illyrian people are always present even if yet not proven, 
and as such, they have always been legitimate and autochthonous nation in the area of 
today’s Kosovo. They claim the Slavic people to be their biggest enemies. On the other 
hand, under the heavy influence of the Institute of Science in Belgrade, Serbian books, 
which are the ones distributed to the Serb minority in Kosovo too, describe Kosovo as their 
holy land, where Serbs were the majority up to when they were expelled by the Ottomans 
and Albanians, depicting the latter as the main enemy of the past and bringing a negative 
image of the outgroup with it.  
During a discussion on the topic in parliament started by the confiscation of around 100 
000 textbooks that were being sent to Albanian living in Presheve Serbian Foreign Minister 
Ivica Dacic declared that “You want textbooks from Kosovo or Albania to be used in 
Serbia, and you want to be taught that Kosovo is independent… That will not be possible.” 
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(Balkan Insight, 2016)
14
. Dacic had declared these secondary education books politically 
unacceptable and that would feed the idea that Albanian war-criminals were heroes. Both 
parties have not given up on their official narratives and are not ready to incorporate the 
alternative views into it. Despite the EU requesting a re-evaluation of history books from 
the Balkan states, none of them has done so yet. This might be a result, or at least aided by 
the lack of the establishment of truth and the acknowledgment of the other’s truth.  
As reconciliation relies on a change in the intergroup relations and the improvement or 
securing of positive relations requires both ‘“horizontal” and “vertical” trust (De Greiff, 
2007, p.8) with the former being individuals and groups trusting their equals and the latter 
means individuals and groups trusting the institutions, it is important to see how Kosovo 
scores in both. According to De Greiff (2007, p. 530) trusting institutions “means knowing 
that its constitutive rules, values and norms are shared by participants and that they regard 
them as binding.” In Kosovo’s case this is severely lacking. Even the most prominent 
figures of the Albanian politics, Thaçi and Haradinaj, had been involved in trials of 
systematic organized crime, including organ trafficking and war crimes, and they have been 
tried in The Hague Tribunal. This has further worsened the Albanian government’s image 
and legitimacy among the Serb community. The Serb minority faces the risk of under-
representability as it is isolated in its representatives and ties to the Serb state, which is 
fragile in front of any change that comes in the Kosovo-Serbia relations. Considering the 
rising distrust in their political elite because of the politicians’ corruption and clientelism, 
the community is found even more politically and socially isolated.  
The trust between the two parties has experienced steps forward just as steps backwards. 
One of the fields in which there has been a degree of change in terms of trust in the 
relations between Serbs and Albanians is that of trade. Economic exchange between 
different parties requires trust and acknowledgement. There has been an increase in it, with 
more trade being organized between the countries. Cities like Gjakove are on the forefront 
of this exchange, signaling to the people in Kosovo that improvement is possible. The same 
can be said about economic relations within the country, there is no ingroup exclusivity 
along ethnic lines in buying consumer good. Another indicator of this improvement is the 
                                                          
14 Press Conference, December 2015 as reported by http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-kosovo-textbooks-
war-sparks-more-protests-02-18-2016  
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increased presence of Serb staff in local business and political scene. On the other hand, it 
is clear that any sparkle can change the situation given its fragility. Every diplomatic 
decision by one of the two states reflects on the situation of the people. Segregated social 
life with limited interaction and different sources of information like media and education 
contribute to the deepening of the distance between Albanians and Serbs.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
What the government has conducted in order to move the reconciliation process forward, 
which as discussed leaves a lot of room for improvement. Kosovo lacks an official 
settlement agreement, leaving room to nationalistic propaganda, instrumentalising the 
situation, and breeding bureaucratic problems. There has been an adjudication process 
taking place in Kosovo, with major political figures being trialed despite their power. The 
plans to establish a special court for the war crimes itself a positive indicator of the steps 
the government is taking towards it. It is not easy for the side that suffered the most 
damage, as observed in the data offered by international bodies, to settle on the idea that it 
might have committed the same crimes too. This in itself is an indicator that, at least for the 
state structures that deal with the negotiations with Serbia and the international actors, a 
degree of identity shift has happened. It is however still to see if this court will be able to 
continue this process forward when it has faced rejection on the part of the Albanian 
majority and the biggest opposition party in the country which holds nearly the same public 
support as the government coalition, Levizja Vetevendosja, is strongly against it. 
On the other hand, the pace with which it is developing and the presence of suspects in the 
top level political life of the country show that it has a lot of room for improvement. It lacks 
of governmental structures for truth telling and completely neglects the Serb minority’s 
narrative of the conflict. It has not conducted any reform on its educational curricula 
leaving an open door for ultra-nationalist propaganda and lacking information to affect yet 
another generation. Additionally, as per UNHCR’s series of reports in early years after the 
conflict the returning process has been slow and threatened by security concerns the Serb 
minority faces in the majority of the Kosovar territory (UNHCR, 2001). However, Peje has 
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scored a degree of development in this direction, with slow but steady returns of Serb 
families (UNHCR, 2001; UNHCR, 2017). 
All considered, Kosovo has failed in conducting transitional justice measures and of 
securing the ground for intergroup reconciliation so far. However, the situation can be often 
dependent on the way the community has absorbed these measures and the additional steps 
local administration has taken in accordance. Very often projects and drafts aiming to help 
the process forward are organized in municipality level which creates different grounds and 
contexts for the effects to take place. Furthermore, even though a descriptive analysis helps 
us to see the situation in numbers, a look at how the subjects of such measures have 
absorbed them and the assessing of their perceptions and attitudes helps us understand 
whether this difficult process has brought any change in society itself better. In 
consideration to the past events and what the state aims to address it seems that the biggest 
concerns to ethnic groups in Kosovo are lack of trust, security issues, outgroup bias and 
discrimination and a lacking justice the next chapter tries to see how these are reflected in 
people’s behavior and the intergroup relations per se.  
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4. INTERGROUP RECONCILIATION 
 
 
 
 
What has been lacking in the pictures painted from the Kosovo case is a look more in 
touch with the population. It was difficult to see how the people of Kosovo lived through 
the tumultuous changes of the last two decades. This void was the main reasoning behind 
this study that’s why it aims to create a space for the voices of the unheard. By following 
semi-structured interviews methodology, I tried to understand and create the opportunity 
for people of Kosovo to express themselves in regard to the reconciliation process, a top-
down process that more often than not loses its touch with the reality.  
All the interviews, in Gjakove and Peje alike, were conducted in places fitting to the 
interviewees’ choice, like their homes or business places. Faced with questions that would 
bring up their identity, conscious stands, opinions and claims, they were presented the 
options of skipping questions or leaving the interview altogether. The sensitivity of the 
topic paired with a bad timing on the investigator side, considering the talks about a new 
War Crimes Tribunal of Kosovo, that understandably raised the suspicions with which I 
was received, increased the difficulty of gathering information that would serve for the 
analysis without having to let go of audio recording. People, even though previously 
informed about the recording, often opted to not be recorded, so the information had to be 
noted during the interviews. Information on the sample can be found in Table 2.  
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Table 2 – Interview Information 
 Albanian  Serb 
Gjakove 14 6 
Peje  13 6 
 
There were 20 interviews conducted in Gjakove and 20 in Peje. The interviews, considering 
the rationale behind the study, were conducted with “normal people”, namely not decision 
makers or politicians, and to grab a more representative sample of the society they try to 
reflect the ethnic ratio of the demography in the cities but were random in gender and age 
terms. The sample includes ex-fighters, clerics, students, businessmen, housewives, 
farmers, engineers, and retirees. Aware of the situation and of the image I as an Albanian, a 
reflection of the majority of the population and the ethnic group governing the country, 
worked towards presenting myself in a less-threatening manner to every interviewee. This 
was done in order to avoid fear, observer bias, spotlight effect, and other potential 
disturbances. 
The questions were targeting five parameters that, according to Nadler and Schnabel 
(Nadler & Schnabel, 2008, p. 48), would define the path of a reconciliation process that 
consists of three consecutive levels of predictions:  
(1) Victims experience a threat to their identity as they are put in the position of 
powerful social actors, and perpetrators face a threat to their identity as they are put 
in the position of moral social actors.  
(2) Therefore, perpetrators seek information that others accept them and view them as 
moral whereas victims seek power and acknowledgement of the injustice done to 
them. The frustration of these needs leads to feelings of moral inferiority or 
powerlessness that constitute barriers to reconciliation.  
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(3) Messages of social acceptance and empowerment satisfies the perpetrators’ and 
victims’ emotional needs, respectively, and is therefore be linked to greater 
willingness to reconcile with one’s adversary. 
As explained in the theoretical part of this thesis they are: ingroup identity, responsibility, 
empathy, trust and forgiveness. 
Gjakove presented a good case for analysis because it was the birthplace of the KLA. It is a 
border area and it includes in its territory the Monastery of Deçan, a very important 
landmark in the Ahtisaari plan and the Serbian stance during the process. Peje on the other 
hand provided a good case of a more stable city, of a richer ethnic composition and 
generally more socially active than Gjakove that is known more for its economic life. 
However, the main difference was that in absorption of centrally developed policies, 
consideration of the interethnic situation in the cities, number of ethnic incidents and of 
additional activities that address and target intergroup reconciliation in the city. Peje scores 
better in this direction with more open interethnic contact, low number of ethnic incidents 
in the last years, and has undertaken measures that deal with truth establishment, justice and 
education in its own borders. The most striking activities on these lines are those of the 
NGOs targeting women in the city and that of Youth Initiative for Human Rights. Both 
have had the support of the local political elites, signaling the support for the reconciliation 
process, very differently from the situation in Gjakove. The NGOs targeting women in Peje 
are working towards creating an environment of mutual trust and equality, providing the 
opportunity for women to regain their voices without discrimination in terms of ethnicity. 
Their activities included getting together (Albanian and Serb women) to talk about the past 
events but also activities that focus on teaching living together, putting in practice some of 
the most important points of the theoretical work on conflict resolution and reconciliation 
like truth telling and the idea of teaching for peaceful coexistence. 
Another very important attempt at transitional justice and intergroup reconciliation comes 
from the university students. A movement named Youth Initiative for Human Rights 
operating in the universities of Mitrovica (the northern, most contested territory between 
Kosovo and Serbia), Prishtina, Prizren and Peje. It is a movement that seeks adjudication 
and change in the legal framework surrounding the process. It brings together law 
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professors and their students in activities that include supporting the legal work of ICTY by 
informing the public about it; monitoring and documenting human rights violations; 
creating opportunities for journalists to meet political leaders and civil society in attempt to 
create the opportunity for them to reach a more inclusive narrative that doesn’t leave the 
outgroup perception out of it. So not only affect the responsibility and empathy factors on 
identity lines, but it is also reflective of the attempt to establish trustworthy state and extra-
state institutions.  
UNHCR reports state that Peje has succeeded in keeping its multicultural status with 
different minorities residing in the area. The return process achieving a degree of success, 
the small but stable number of Serb residents, the local political structures aiding work 
conducted to address intergroup reconciliation and transitional justice like the ones cited 
above, the joint work to address security concerns of the community as UNHCR states in 
its reports (UNHCR, 2001; UNHCR, 2017) and as it’s seen from these activities in the area 
have put Peje several steps ahead of its neighboring district of Gjakove. These as factors 
that show the will and support of the local power for the reconciliation process and mean a 
more positive attitude is expected in it, this makes it a perfect setting for the comparison 
with Gjakove its hostile medium towards Serbs, and its reluctance in undertaking or 
absorbing any such attempt at reconciliation. 
 
4.1. Identity 
 
The most important aspect to open the interviews was that of identity for three reasons: to 
make sure the interviewees self-categorized in ingroups and defined outgroups considering 
the study is looking for two specific ethnic groups, to understand how they approached the 
past events under its lens, and lastly to see if there is any change in it, as Kelman argues 
that there would be an effect on reconciliation processes (2008). This change would be a 
direct reflection of the effect adjudication and truth telling would have on a group because 
they are expected to re-shape the stances on victimhood and assign new ‘roles’ to people.  
Firstly, my interest in the case is to see how sociopolitical measures affect ethnic groups’ 
relations with each other. For this reason, identity and the establishment of the connection 
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between collective and individual is very important. I tried to see how Albanians and Serbs 
saw each other, for which I needed to have the people confirm they self-identified with 
their respective ethnic groups. Additionally, I needed to make sure that their understanding 
of the ‘other’ was as expected for the interview to take place, which is Albanians seeing 
Serbs as the other and vice versa.  
All the interviewees had very clear identities, every Albanian interview clearly defined the 
‘us’ as the Albanians and ‘them’ as the Serb minority, in both cities. The Serb interviewees 
did the same. Even if the questions had followed an undefined profile of the groups, all the 
interviewees defined the ‘us’ and ‘them’ on ethnic lines. It was observed that the “us” and 
“them” of the past corresponded to the “us” and “them” of the present. This in itself is an 
indication of the clear division in Peje and Gjakove that was reinforced by the outgroup’s 
acts towards them. A middle-aged woman from Gjakove explains:  
“They knew who was who and who everyone sided with. Even the Catholics 
(Catholic Albanians) were not on our side. They were all spies. We just had 
ourselves.” (GJ7) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
While the Serb interviewees did not use any particular term, the Albanian ones used the 
word “shkije”, a term meaning enemy specifically used for Serbs and high in negative 
connotations.  
How did their identity serve as a lens to judge the events that have taken place? Is there any 
shift in identity as Kelman argues there would be when reconciliatory measures are 
initiated by states? That would be, bringing new elements of identity, accommodating 
differences of the others and incorporating such differences, like admitting they committed 
crimes against the other group and that they are not only victims, into their existing 
identities without having the need to say we are the same group. To look at this, the 
subjects were asked about the event that affected them the most. Social identity theories 
suggest that ingroup members tend to overvalue their own suffering and undervalue that of 
the outgroup. This is closely tied to adjudication and truth telling because it reflects on how 
people see the victim and the perpetrator, what they see as the past crimes and what would 
be justice for them.  
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Albanian interviewees in both cities showed very strong stances on these divisions. They 
not only show these divisions in retrospective, but also in future terms, contrary to what 
would be expected in societies where at least a start to a reconciliation process has been 
made. This might be a result of how deeply rooted in identity the conflict and the post-
conflict period has been.  
 
“I will never forget when they closed us within the walls of the school. It was 
us, women and the elderly. I thought I was going to die, I was sure they 
wouldn’t let us go. Why would they when they hate us” (GJ8) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
“We and they cannot be compared, we were only civilians, and we didn’t have 
any power. I don’t know how our government wants to establish a court 
betraying its own citizens. We aren’t equal.”(P24) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
The identity shift expected from the Serbs would be them accepting and acknowledging 
their citizenship or Kosovar identity as it doesn’t have ethnic connotations. On the other 
hand, it would acknowledge the legitimacy of the fight for sovereignty that Albanians 
conducted, that they recognized the crimes against them and that they were ready for a 
ground of commonality. However, this wasn’t observed in any of the interviews in both 
cities, every identity reference done during the interviews was Serb or Albanian. The 
interesting aspect regarding identity and how it reflects on past and future, noticed during 
interviews with the Serb interviewees is that they tie themselves exclusively to the Serb 
state. None of the interviewees in any way showed any hint of them at least seeing 
themselves as citizens of a country called Kosovo and represented by Albanian leaders. 
They all were completely indifferent to their status as Kosovo citizens (Kosovars). This is 
not only an indication of the lack of any change in identity that post-conflict measures were 
supposed to bring, but also a reflection of the Serb state’s refusal of recognizing Kosovo 
and the strong ties the community in Kosovo has with it as it was observed in both Gjakove 
and Peje habitants.  
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“Albanians don’t want us here but this is where our home is. We cannot 
abandon everything and go. We are just trying to live our lives” (GJ16) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
“We both suffered but no one know we were victims too. It’s been nearly 20 
years since the war. We just want to be left alone” (P33) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
From the answers received, no clear verbal indication of an accommodating shift in identity 
was recorded. It is possible to say that there was no change in the attitude of the habitants 
of Peje and those of Gjakove in terms of categorization and identity, nor any shift or 
attempt of accommodation of novel positions in these identities meaning there is no 
significant observable effect of the reconciliation policy attempts in Peje. 
 
4.2. Responsibility 
 
While identity as a factor affecting the absorption of post-conflict policies, and one that is 
also affected by it, guilt share or responsibility is a direct look at what touches people who 
have undergone trauma the most: the sense of justice. It is crucial to understand how two 
groups associate with guilt and victimhood and how they bring the outgroup into the 
equation. To understand whether Albanians and Serbs in Peje have a different relation with 
guilt and responsibility from those in Gjakove, they were asked questions that addressed the 
root of the conflict and how it deteriorated. The root was asked because it would help us 
understand who is the first to blame for the group members while questions about the 
escalation of the conflict would help us understand if they have managed to see a dynamic 
in it, if they have looked at the events with a cause- effect mode and if they ever thought 
that each party’s action might have reflected differently, spiraling the situation into what it 
became.  
The ways to address this on state level are all the ones mentioned in the descriptive 
analysis: the settlement to recognize a just cause, adjudication for at least key figure 
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criminals so that there would be a sense of justice for the parties, truth telling to bring the 
truths of each group onto the table with the least possible bias and trust building education 
to teach it to future generations for the crime to not be replicates or the dynamics to be 
healed. On state level, as we saw, Kosovo lacks in all of these fields. However, it does not 
spread equally over their geography and as we saw in the introduction to this chapter, Peje 
has worked more in this direction. How does this translate into the people’s stances? This 
focuses on three points, who do they think has the major responsibility for the war, do they 
think of the conflict in a dynamic equation view with each party’s action soliciting an 
answer from the other and do they see both groups as potential perpetrators?  
When ingroup members categorize victims as members of a distinct group, a pro-ingroup 
bias is activated, which results in use of more “ingroup serving” definitions of injustice 
(Miron & Branscombe, 2008, p. 92) meaning they are more inclined to see the injustices 
committed against them as a group and ignore the ones committed against the outgroup. 
Accordingly, when they categorize perpetrators and guilty figures, it is easier to go for the 
outgroup.  
“They took their most deadly weapons and came to our homes, our shelters, 
our families, because they (Serbia/Serbs) wanted this land” (GJ12) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
a former KLA fighter said. Another Albanian interviewee from Gjakove, a young 
university student was very determined in his stance that  
“It doesn’t need much to understand they hated us, this was a way to take us 
out and grab our land too” (GJ4) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
Another interviewee from Gjakove said: 
“It wasn’t anything new which started in that year. They had been preying on 
us for a long time. When it happened we couldn’t sit and wait to get 
exterminated” (GJ10) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
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A similar answer would come from young woman in a village of Gjakove who after several 
minutes of silence and reluctance to answer the questions said: 
“They did everything to make us suffer and they succeeded. We lost our men, 
lost our fathers. We were left alone in groups of women who didn’t know where 
to go. How can I even talk about it like this (so nonchalantly)?”(GJ13) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
It is clear to see that the Albanian interviewees in Gjakove follow the lines of the theory 
above. Their view of the victim and perpetrator and the share of guilt is focusing on the 
Serb side. These answers are a clear indication of how besides seeing the outgroup as the 
sole perpetrators, they also attribute the escalation of conflict to the outgroup with 
mentioning “preying on us for a long time” or “did everything to make us suffer”. These 
statements do not leave room for the acknowledgment of the responsibility on their side, 
especially when they come from former KLA members. We can witness this understanding 
when Albanians mention the asymmetry of violence. More than 50% of the Albanian 
interviewees mentioned how they would never be the same with the other group, in terms 
of guilt and responsibility because the difference in what they owned in terms of military or 
governmental power was abysmal, again hinting at the continuum of violence and conflict 
only on the outgroup with what sounded like definitions of systematic oppression. 
“They had the police. They had the soldiers. We didn’t…we didn’t know how to 
handle weapons.” (GJ9) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
said another former KLA member whose family was held hostage during one of the 
massacres in Gjakove. 
Albanians in Peje exhibited a similar attitude of ingroup serving bias in terms of 
victimhood and seeing the outgroup as the sole actor to bear responsibility for the conflict 
as a whole. A woman from Peje, said  
“I couldn’t understand why they (Serbs) hated us (Albanians) to that degree. 
We didn’t do anything to them but suddenly they were at our doors telling us to 
leave the places we called home. It wasn’t their home!” (P7) 
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(Interviewed in November 2017) 
Another interviewee from Peje refused to accept a scenario where the outgroup might have 
suffered under ingroup’s potential abuse.  
“There is only one to blame for the doom and that is Serbia and the ones they 
brought to this country after expelling us.” (P31) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
On the other hand, the Serb interviewees in both cities were more detached. Their answers 
varied around political terms and the need to tell that they had wronged the other side but 
they had been caught in the middle too even when they didn’t support what the Serbian 
state was doing. A young man from Serbs in Gjakove simply answered:  
“What caused this conflict? Politics.” (GJ19) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
It was certainly an interesting answer because it reflected the ability of the interviewee to 
differ between political interests or moves and people’s ones. It shows how he was aware of 
the political instrumentalisation of ethnic divergences that might have taken place. 
However, it may be also interpreted as an inability or lack of will to understand the root of 
the problem, insisting on identifying its manifestations (the aggressive ethnic based 
politics) as the root. A male interviewee from Peje shared similar views on how the 
instrumentalisation of the existing divergences was what lied at the root of the conflict 
saying:  
“We suffered from what Milosevic did too. They (Albanians) at least could 
fight back, we did not have the power to do anything but be crashed in the 
middle” (P26) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
Another female interview shared the same stance and her worries of the Serb minority’s 
pain being completely ignored saying: 
“Years and years of mutual hate and never understanding each other, political 
interests and greedy politicians brought us to the point someone was killing his 
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neighbor and our houses were destroyed by bombs. It didn’t serve anyone for 
anything, it only brought pain to all of us” (P29) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
Serb interviewees’ opinions scatter around the same axis too: they want acknowledgment of 
their victimhood, for this reason it is expected that they do see the conflict as a dynamic 
exchange between the parties. They are not ashamed to accept the fact that they are 
powerless in Kosovo, but this on the other hand does not go along their line of attachment 
to the Serb state. They seem to keep the tie strong sometimes and in times when it is to take 
responsibility, they distance themselves.  
The other important aspect of this is whether they feel like the adjudication process was 
adequate and brought them justice for the past. The answers were ranging from:  
“Justice here is as corrupt as the state itself, we have given up on it” (GJ5) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
“If they continue hiding their dogs there will be no justice, it’s their state who 
protects them and has no intentions of putting them in front of justice” (GJ3) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
To answers that again focused on the asymmetry of power and criticized the government’s 
plan of establishing a court meant to deal with crimes committed by Albanians against 
Serbs as: 
“I don’t know how our government wants to establish a court betraying its own 
citizens. We aren’t equal.” (P24) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
Serb interviewees on the other hand were very insistent on the fact that major suspected 
war criminals (including Kosovo’s current and past Presidents) were able to continue their 
political lives.  
“They cannot speak of justice when criminals like Thaçi lead the state” (GJ15) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
or  
80 
 
“Justice hasn’t worked for us. The ones to be behind bars are still free and we 
are left with the past. Maybe we should forget about it completely and build 
new lives. What’s the use of insisting on it?” (P29) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
The complete disappointment in seeking justice post-conflict was emphasized by the laughs 
that at least 4 young interviewees answered my question with. Very telling was also the fact 
that several interviewees were very reluctant on talking about it overall, especially female 
interviewees, or that they directly told that they were suspicious this was for the secret 
services. When faced with the idea of intergroup justice, Albanians pried away and even 
insinuated that the researcher might be a spy for the government digging up their pasts and 
trying to please the foreign powers by finding scapegoats. There was no observable 
significant difference between the interviewees from Peje and those from Gjakove, 
meaning there has been no or little effect of any attempt conducted or supported so far in 
Peje.  
4.3.  Empathy 
 
Empathy is the other side of the coin of responsibility; if responsibility and guilt share are 
concerning groups falling into the role of the perpetrator and feeling collective guilt, 
empathy focuses more on a mutual status of victimhood. Learning about the outgroup’s 
past, their point of view and how they lived the same events helps not only understand the 
group but also helps the justice mechanism too. A process of building a peaceful 
coexistence would require the accumulation of steps that indicate acceptance of the other as 
an authentic nation and inclusion of the other in one’s own moral community like political 
recognition and acknowledgment of the other’s legitimacy, humanization of the other, 
including respect for their dignity, concern for their welfare, and attachment of value to the 
other’s lives and security.  
For this factor, truth telling and education come first. Even though persecution is a process 
that defines the victim as much as the perpetrator, it is more detached from the people than 
truth seeking. The answers provided for the responsibility assessment show us that the 
process itself is oftentimes of no interest to people because it is an elongation of the state so 
whatever issue Albanians or Serbs have with the state, they have with its justice 
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mechanisms too. Truth telling aims to address a common phenomenon in intractable 
conflicts like the Kosovo one: As Fry (2006) argues the perpetrator group “can distance 
themselves from the pain and suffering of the adversary by belittling them or by feeling no 
empathy with the victim’s sufferings thus increasing the social distance between oneself 
and the victim lowers empathy” ( as cited in Nadler & Schnabel, 2008, p. 47). They may do 
so by victim-blaming, by asserting or implying that the victim “brought it on himself or 
herself”, or by attributing their harmful actions to external constraints like them also being 
victims. 
Many answers were just a continuation or repetition of what the interviewees said about 
responsibility. Young Albanian interviewees from Gjakove had the strongest reactions to 
the question of whether they had ever tried to look at the outgroup’s point of view with: 
“The international community already takes care of that, they are showing 
them as victims too. There’s no need for us to do it.” (GJ1) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
Two of them were simple “No” (GJ18) (GJ2) answers without them developing further 
and one of them was completely calm, saying:  
“I don’t want to do that. I don’t care about that when they treated us the way 
they did” (GJ3) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
It was very interesting to witness this behavior because it differed from the ones from 
relatively older interviewees, like a man from Peje who despite having been imprisoned and 
tortured during the period said:  
“I was a kid when they closed me in a hole and left me starving. But they were 
persecuted after we came back. We chased them out. Now I have family and I 
want them to have the same. It’s all in the past” (P22) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
This sentiment was shared among Serb interviewees in both cities to some point.  
“It’s not the villagers’ fault that the politicians put their interest first” (P15) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
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“We suffered from what Milosevic did too. They (Albanians) at least could 
fight back” (P26) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
However, their understanding of empathy is more inclined to their pain being 
acknowledged rather than about them accepting the other side’s victimhood. The former is 
the one being ignored in their opinions as it was observable in how they addressed each 
side and their actions above. 
It is interesting that people who even fought in the war are less harsh towards the outgroup 
in terms of empathy than youngsters. It is also important to see how despite engaging 
similar mechanisms, it is easier for the subjects of these interviews to acknowledge pain, in 
some way, but hard to acknowledge their responsibility or guilt. This might be a result of 
how each is perceived. Guilt is associated with trials and getting punished, however 
empathy requires the subject to admit the other suffered too and doesn’t have any binding 
mechanism to it and this might be the reason that despite lacking processes behind both 
guilt share and empathy, a degree of empathy is more present and observable in both cities. 
This might also be because, fitting of their ideas of peace, empathy doesn’t require living 
with each other or having contact. It can be done is divided settings too. 
There is no significant observable difference in levels of empathy towards the outgroup 
between the habitants of Peje and Gjakove. However, there is a slight difference among 
young and older Albanians in Gjakove with the latter being more strongly opinionated and 
not accepting the other’s victim status. This might be just a result of the older generation 
being politer and accommodating than the youth or it might be an indicator of the 
deteriorating interethnic situation. Considering how the most politically active are the adult 
– middle aged groups and Gjakove’s situation shows signs of deteriorating interethnic 
relations (ethnic incidents, decreasing Serb minority presence), I would argue that is what 
brings the hostility of Albanians towards the Serb minority.  
4.4. Trust 
 
The first thing that reconciliation tries to mend between conflicting parties is trust. This is 
because it translates into an improvement in how they see each other’s attempts to improve 
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the tense situation, how they would deal with each other and how they would rebuild their 
relationships with each other. It is the most important condition to peaceful coexistence. 
The first part would be trust in their politicians, especially entrusting them the power to 
conduct any process after the conflict. This is important because it means Albanians trust 
the fairness of their elections and the ability to lead, and that Serbs recognize their 
legitimacy. However as seen in the descriptive part of this thesis, that isn’t the case. Besides 
this level of trust, it is important to address two other aspects of it, direct trust in the other 
group and trusting them as leaders. Faced with the question if they would elect a 
representative from the outgroup all responses were negative, making a strong statement 
regarding how they trust the outgroup.  
However, trusting the outgroup in economic issues is not that difficult for Gjakove 
habitants it seems. This was a surprising result when the expectation would have been the 
opposite. Gjakove city habitants (5) answer that they would have no problems conducting 
economic transactions and having their money entrusted to Serbs. A man from Gjakove 
who continuously travelled to Serbia for trade said: 
 
“I’ve doing this business for years, they have never played any games. Even 
though the bridge police (Mitrovica) is not very friendly to us, I haven’t 
encountered any problem in Belgrade” (GJ5) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
Another man from Gjakove, owner of a money exchange point said:  
“I don’t care who is who, business is a completely different thing” (GJ2) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
However, villagers didn’t have the same opinion. One of them even criticized the behavior 
of the city habitants, hinting at the truthiness of their dedication to identity by saying: 
“One cannot trust them (Albanians in the city), because they’re ready to trust 
anyone as long as they get the money” (GJ11) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
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This presence of trust created by economic exchange among Serbs and Albanians means 
that there is an opportunity to cultivate trust when interests fall on the same line and for the 
city of Gjakove, building economic relations might be the key.  
The situations among Serbs was completely different. They were very distrustful of 
Albanians, in terms of government, representation, or coexistence. The words of the head 
of a Serb male at the Monastery of Deçan (GJ19) emphasized how they did not feel 
threatened, however, this seems only valid for people who live within heavily protected 
areas as another Serb interview was not hiding the concern and fear: 
 
“We are only a few. If something happens again we will be the first in 
danger.” (GJ14) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
This seems reoccurring as another one (P38) cites how it is difficult to travel and that the 
poor economic situation makes it difficult to move so they feel unsafe and scared of any 
development.  
The assassination in January 2018 of Oliver Ivanovic, a top politician serving as a moderate 
leader of the Serbs in Kosovo, settled this situation of unrest and seems to have increased 
the level of tensions and distrust between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo too.  
Trust was the category both groups in both cities seemed to have moved least in. There is 
no significant difference found between the interviewees from Peje and those from Gjakove 
signaling that the attempts at establishing truth among the two groups have not brought any 
significant effect. However, there seems to be a slight difference in the responses of 
Gjakove interviewees that were working in business. They seemed to have developed a 
sense of trust towards the outgroup thanks to their continuous economic exchanges. 
Considering the difficult setting of Gjakove this is of outmost importance as it offers the 
decision makers a ground for improvement in intergroup trust and intergroup relations. 
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4.5. Forgiveness 
 
The last factor in the process is that of forgiveness. The apology-forgiveness cycle 
represents a social interaction that satisfies the psychological needs of victims and 
perpetrators as it gives perpetrators the ‘power’ to change their past behavior and are 
signaled that “the victims understand the circumstances that drove the perpetrators to 
commit wrongdoings and that they forgive them for these wrongdoings implies to 
perpetrators that they are no longer viewed as immoral and bad and should not be 
concerned about being socially excluded by the victims or the community” (Nadler & 
Schnabel, 2008, p. 49). The victims are given the power they lacked in their earlier position 
where they were committed injustice against. They can have an effect on the more powerful 
group and forgiving or not they are tying the perpetrator’s moral status to their words. It is 
important to reconciliation because it gives a sense of equality, and an identity shift, that 
was the first factor of it. So, the change-axis would be complete.  
However, in Kosovo the conditions to reach it are not ripe. Firstly, there has been no 
official apology for the past events on either side. In many other post-conflict processes it 
has been a very important part of it. South Africa and New Zealand show that in cases of 
severe crimes on identity lines, such a move would help the reconciliation process forwards 
because it shows the party’s commitment to it, it sets the example for the other levels of 
society and it helps set the fundamentals for further process like adjudication, truth telling 
and reparation (Kelman H. , 2008; Miron & Branscombe, 2008, p. 87). Considering it is 
possible to see the ground for forgiveness when looking at how they address responsibility 
and guilt share, this part focused more on what would follow forgiveness. The interviews 
were held subject to questions like how do you see the peaceful future, with the underlying 
attempt to understand whether there is any chance they have mended or would mend their 
relationship along with the theoretical claim that forgiveness would manifest in the form of 
social inclusion. 
The Albanian interviewees in Gjakove and Peje, regardless of any attempt at reconciliation, 
seem to see a future they would be fine with, if there is clear separation in the lives of the 
ingroup and outgroup.  
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Two interviewees in two different places in Gjakove shared the same sentence: 
“Our future would be peaceful if we are dealing with our own lives 
separately.” (GJ9) (GJ13) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
Another Albanian, a woman from Peje, on the same line said: 
“As long as we don’t mingle in each other’s lives here, everyone should be 
able to live undisturbed.” (P28) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
Another one from Peje, when asked about who he had to blame said:  
“It’s all in the past. It doesn’t matter anymore everyone is just trying to live.” 
(P22) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
Albanians of Peje and Gjakove exhibited similar opinion on the desire to see their lives 
separated from the outgroup. There wasn’t any change in opinion in terms of age groups, 
nor city or village habitants.  
Peje and Gjakove Serbs had similar stances on peaceful coexistence making both groups in 
both cities see the only possible future as divided communities. However, in their case, they 
addressed leaving too, citing that even though it sounds easy to leave difficult conditions, 
the improvement is not guaranteed with changing places, reinforcing the idea that the 
Kosovo Serbs are in a difficult limbo situation. 
 
“It’s been nearly 20 years since the war. We just want to be left alone” (P33) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
“We cannot abandon everything and leave”. (GJ16) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
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“I can conduct my life normally even if I live in a protected area. No one 
bothers us when we go to the city.” (GJ19) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
 
“A lot from us have left for Serbia and never came back. Once you leave it you 
cannot get it back you have to start from zero. Maybe one day I will do the 
same.”(P35) 
(Interviewed in November 2017) 
More than peaceful coexistence, the words of the Serb interviewees seem like they just 
want to be tolerated and the words of the Albanian interviewees signal the opposite stance: 
that of having to tolerate each other’s existence. This does not in any way entail the 
empowerment of the victim and morality of the perpetrator for which forgiveness stands 
for. Nor does it reflect a positive sign for building a medium for coexistence. Rather it 
seems like a negative peace, one where they just want to avoid any clashes and if separation 
is the way to achieve it, they choose that. The very idea that both groups have of peace 
being the lack of incident and contact goes to show have very little has been done to reach 
their worries and how little impact any policy attempt has had in the area. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The interviews conducted in Gjakove and Peje did not present any significant change 
between the approach and perception towards each other that Albanians and Serbs in both 
areas had. It wasn’t possible to detect any shift in identity; Albanians hadn’t accommodated 
the idea that their ingroup might have been a perpetrator too, Serbs had difficulties in 
seeing their ingroup members, except for politicians and decision-makers, had had a role in 
the atrocities committed towards the other group, they don’t seem to have acknowledged 
the Kosovar term, even though it is a neutral term to avoid ethnic connotations still very 
strongly present in the area. This is strongly reflected in how the subjects address 
responsibility and empathy and in them majorly attributing negative traits and acts to the 
outgroup while attributing victimhood status to the ingroup.  
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The lack of an official settlement and an official apology from the states seems to have had 
a role in the way they relate to identity and forgiveness while the issues in addressing 
responsibility, empathy and trust seem to stem more from the lack of a mutually 
acknowledged narrative that includes both sides of the past, the lack of legitimacy the 
government has in the people’s eyes, a lacking sense of justice, and fear of repetition of the 
past. 
The factor that showed the most development was that of empathy. Even though only to a 
certain degree, it would be an indicator of how recognizing the outgroup’s suffering is not 
as hard as acknowledging the ingroup’s guilt in Kosovo. This might be useful for the future 
of this process as it might be turned into the stepping stone. Maybe it might be effective to 
start from building empathy by establishing truth and then move into the other steps of the 
process. The factor that showed the least advancement was that of trust, even though some 
Gjakove habitants displayed a degree of trust in economic relations with the outgroup. In 
this case, this might stem from the lack of structures that provide security for the minorities 
or the lack of legitimacy the state apparatus has in their eyes, the fear of the repetition of 
the conflict and the uncertainty of the future.  
All considered, the attitudes of the subjects seem not affected by the attempts at 
reconciliation, they show the same patterns in both areas of interest indicating that the 
measures have been ineffective in addressing intergroup grievances.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions and Their Reflection on the Initial Theory 
 
As literature teaches “the culture of peace is characterized by participation in shaping a 
common future, respect for human right, solidarity, cooperation, mutual understanding, 
equality and justice” (Chicuecue, 1997, p. 485). My research explores the scope and 
limitations of transitional justice as a tool for successful transformation of intergroup 
relations and as a potential actor in pursuing intergroup reconciliation. With this purpose, 
this study presents a literature review of both conflict resolution and intergroup relations, 
the discussion steered toward the direction of the latter being subject to the measures and 
action that constitute a transitional justice and further on a reconciliation process. The thesis 
offers a theoretical discussion of what would be the possible approaches to a post-conflict 
period and what would work better considering the context of Kosovo. Borrowing from 
similar cases and the theoretical discussion on interethnic conflicts I argued that the most 
important steps to take would be to bring measure for accountability and acknowledgment 
of the past in order to bring a long-term change that would affect not only state structures in 
Kosovo but their social structures and dynamics too. I argued that transitional justice would 
have a major impact on intergroup reconciliation as it addresses the broken ties between 
groups during its steps.  
The descriptive analysis conducted in third chapter, focused on assessing whether Kosovo 
had gained momentum in the reconciliation process and how the steps were being 
performed. The evidence suggested that both Kosovo and Serbia had conducted only 
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limited action in this direction. As the analysis extended to adjudication, it showed that the 
process in Kosovo has been stagnant for the recent years and it seems to be severely 
suffering from the state corruption preventing the political elites from responding to 
people’s interests. There seems to be a level of development in adjudication but none in 
reparation or dealing with disappearances or the returning process. There also is a relation 
between the power asymmetry during the conflict and the legitimacy or the degree of 
commitment to the process afterwards for Kosovo. Additionally, the truth that Kosovo’s 
judicial, executive and legislative power-holding institutions are not only new but also have 
experienced continuous change, from international bodies like KFOR, UNMIK and 
EULEX to the national structures during this short period of time seems to have increased 
its inefficiency.  
Regarding the creation of opportunities for acknowledgment, Kosovo seems to not have 
advanced. The state of Kosovo has not encouraged truth commissions or the establishment 
of an inclusive narrative that would acknowledge the ‘other’. This is observable in the lack 
of educational reforms addressing official teaching of the conflict too. There is also a strong 
connection between the lack of an official agreement between Kosovo and Serbia and voids 
in the aforementioned processes, as it not only severely affects the technic and bureaucratic 
development of these measures, but it also signals the insisting on the status quo and 
reluctance to recognize the other to the ethnic groups. This finding seems in line with 
previous work conducted in the area suggesting that the lack of an official agreement on 
Kosovo’s status lies at the basis of its current structural issues. 
The fourth chapter focuses on field research that would help the assessment of an 
association between any type of transitional justice measure and its effect on intergroup 
relations and social dynamics. The selection of Peje and Gjakove as the site for my 
interview subjects was a result of the consideration of the literature on what factors of a 
settlement would affect people. Borrowing identity, guilt/responsibility, empathy, trust and 
forgiveness, as factors in an axis of positive change in intergroup relations after a violent 
conflict from Nadler & Schnabel (2008) and Kelman (2004), I developed a tentative set of 
questions for interviews.  
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The interviews, contrary to the expectation, did not show any significant difference 
between the approach to the outgroup that people in Peje and those in Gjakove had. Kelman 
(2008) puts a lot of importance on this shift in identity and its evolution. However, it might 
be said that it is a shortcoming of the process so far when it is observed that there was no 
observable accommodation of new identity factors neither in Peje nor in Gjakove. The 
Kosovar identity has not been acknowledged by the Serb community at all, a clear 
reflection of the stance the Serb state is showing. A similar behavior is observed on the 
other side where he Albanian side has not acknowledged its perpetrator status. The 
interviewees reflected a reluctance in acknowledging their guilt share of the past events 
even though several Albanian leaders have been tried for war crimes against Serbs in 
Kosovo. However, there is an observable presence of empathy and acknowledging the 
other’s victimhood among the interviews. This can be explained by the lack of structural 
commitment empathy has, different to acknowledging responsibility. It is easier to 
acknowledge the other side might have suffered too if the group does not have to follow it 
by getting penalized or sharing collective guilt. Both areas showcase no significant 
difference in trust, however Gjakove seems to have developed a new channel for it, 
economic exchange. As Bulman & Werther (2008) claim, this type of recognizing the other 
as more than just bad traits is a very important step towards the improvement of relations 
between groups. In line with positive contact theory (Allport, 1979) explained earlier on, 
this type of exchange resulting in positive bias might turn into a very valuable channel for 
future developments between the two groups in the country. Ultimately, neither Gjakove 
nor Peje show any level of forgiveness and inclusive peace. Reinforced by their stances on 
responsibility and the ingroup bias reflected in it, the interviewees were convinced of living 
in separate settlement as the only mean of peaceful future, still reflecting the lack of a 
mutual agreement on the conflict resolution. The people of Peje and Gjakove were of the 
same divisive, distrustful, scapegoating and victim-blaming towards the outgroup, despite 
the interviewees from Peje having been exposed to a degree of reconciliatory measures 
compared to Gjakove that is in total lack of them. This, when considered under the 
importance Tutu (1999) and Gobodo-Madikizela (2002) give to forgiveness, as learned 
from the South African case, and their equalization of forgiveness with ‘moving on’, means 
that this absence puts another hurdle in the road to intergroup reconciliation in the country. 
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The overall discussion negatively answers my questions for this thesis. Kosovo seems to 
not have sufficiently committed itself to reconciliation process and it is lacking in all its 
aspects. It seems it has conducted a deeply flawed post-conflict process, undermining the 
idea that a peace agreement solves every issue that lead to or followed by conflict, 
especially when there is risk of repetition. The fieldwork suggests that the 2 major ethnic 
groups in Kosovo, regardless of reconciliation, do not seem to be finding a unified sense of 
future, which might mean a continuation of the separatist mindset in everyday lives.  
The samples of the fieldwork seem to suggest that for the case of Kosovo there might be 
two explanations. First, in absence of state-run and state-enforced structures for 
adjudication, truth telling, indiscriminative information, educational change and any other 
reconciliatory measure, locally supported or grassroots activities exert little to no effect in 
intergroup relations bringing little to no degree of intergroup reconciliation. Second, 
transitional justice has overall little to no effect in the population. Both of these conclusions 
might be argued and supported by the data provided in this thesis. What this study further 
shows is that the core issues transitional justice and reconciliation as a process seem to face 
in Kosovo is the lack of a mutually agreed resolution document, lack of trust between 
parties (horizontal) and between parties and the state (vertical) and a general lack of 
knowledge of the narrative of the past and dealing with them would be the right action to be 
taken by the state. 
 
Contribution and Future Recommendations 
 
The theoretical contribution this study offers is bringing the theoretical construct of 
intergroup relations and reconciliation into the post-conflict state measures or transitional 
justice discourse. By distinguishing between purely political interventions and more 
socially based ones, it offers an original contribution into the social psychology of post-
conflict. It also offers a framework for understanding the actions that would contribute to 
reconciliation in inter-ethnic conflicts with a focus on the divisive aspects as they would be 
addressed by the policies.  
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This empirical contribution this study brings is in the data it brings from an analysis of 
bilateral or unilateral governmental policies in Kosovo and by seeing how they might have 
had any effect on the population by conducting fieldwork in the area. Considering time and 
resources limitations, it focuses on two areas that are expected to offer a representative 
view of the whole country given their geographical, demographical, economical and 
historical characteristics. It is of importance to understand whether the right steps are being 
taken in the right direction as Kosovo being a new state faces additional difficulties in 
handling long term processes. It is also vital to see if they are having any effect and 
regulating in accordance to their shortcomings if they aren’t. 
Beyond the case study, what studying Kosovo offers is a contribution to comparative 
analysis as it gives the opportunity to understand transitional justice and reconciliation in 
secessionist states with continuing ethnic issues. The most similar case is geographically 
close, Bosnia. Surviving ethnic divergences and governmental insufficiency are common 
issues both face which means that any attempt at understanding one of them could help 
research about the other. Furthermore, the deeply rooted ethnic divisions and continuous 
ethnic clashes in Kosovo share striking similarities with the Kurdish issue in Turkey and 
the Basque autonomy issue in Spain even though the latter two haven’t created new states 
so far. It is helpful to understand whether separating groups, to create more separation like 
in the case of Kosovo, is the only solution to a conflict case like theirs. The power 
asymmetry, political identity and intergroup relations issues are present in all the three 
cases. Studying how Kosovo dealt with them help us realize that there is a possibility that 
transitional justice and reconciliation might not be enough to deal with intractable conflicts 
in these types of settings. Furthermore, creating new state structures, securing their 
efficiency, passing efficiently from being the ethnic minority to being the ethnic majority 
and addressing whole new processes like securing justice and reconciliation proved to be a 
very difficult task for Kosovo in these past 20 years. This should encourage us to analyze 
and research about other possible ways of dealing with this issue rather than focusing on a 
process that has not always bred peace.  
It is worthy of noting that the idea of separating or exclusive areas for each group seems to 
be in the plans of the Kosovar and Serb state too. Very recently, talks about re-assigning 
borders to accommodate ethnic divisions, or land swap, have surfaced. The proposed idea is 
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that of exchanging the Northern Serb majority areas with the Albanian majority areas. In 
short, Kosovo gets the Valley of Presheve (the majority of Albanians under Serb rule live in 
this area), and Serbia gets back what’s in the northern part of Ibar, the river that divides 
Mitrovica the most contested territory in two parts between Serbs and Albanians. The plan 
has been backed by the majority of EU members with Germany being the strongest oppose 
and the US, the two major international actors in the on-going Kosovo-Serbia negotiations 
and all the parties seem to see it as ‘the magical wand’ to the resolution as the media has 
called it.  
Surprisingly, even though it had never been part of the public discourse in Kosovo so far, 
after the idea was introduced by Vucic in the first half of 2018 it found direct support from 
the Kosovar government. This has given rise to suspicions that it had been proposed before 
and kept hidden froom the people and it has caused a response from Vetevendosja and the 
general population in Kosovo, as local media like Balkan Insight or Ora or international 
outlets like BBC report. Even the terminology used during these months suggests a brewing 
issue that moves the plan’s description from “border correction” to “land swap” leaving 
room for speculations and propaganda.  
The idea might sound good if we think that it is like a surgical intervention to take out the 
root of the issue, however I would argue that, what happened in 1913 (London Conference) 
or the wars in Balkans themselves were also meant to deal with assigning ethnic groups to 
territories they “belong” in and the consequences of such plans and strategies are what we 
study on as ethnic conflicts in the Balkans today. Basically it is difficult for me to see how 
another deep intervention on ethnic groups’ settlements would be different from what the 
region has been through in the past. Peace by separation is seldom the case in decisions that 
involve peace-building and divided societies so this option requires further research. If 
Kosovo and Serbia are still troubled by what happened to their territories, how does a 
similar move make the situation better? Yet, as both have failed to develop their 
multicultural profiles, so it is possible to try another approach to the wounds and issues the 
conflict has left but are two countries too much to sacrifice in such “experimenting”. 
Kosovo risks to lose its major economic leverage with the Mine of Trepce and their fresh 
water resources becoming part of Serbia while Serbia risks to lose any touch with the Serbs 
living beyond their major loci, like Peje and Gjakove too. However, both the states seem 
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adamant on their need to please to receive EU passes which might mean that this plan, even 
though lacking of Kosovo citizens’ approval might become reality. 
This is an important development to note for this means that with a population change, the 
whole reconciliation process might be abandoned and Kosovo’s case would need even 
further studies to be understood. 
  
96 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Agjencia e Statistikave Kosove. (2012). ASK. Retrieved from ASK: http://ask.rks-gov.net/ 
Albon, M. (1992). Truth and Justice.  
Allport, G. W. (1979). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge: Perseus Books. 
Amnesty International. (2009). Report on Kosovo.  
Amnesty International. (2012). Report on Kosovo.  
Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism. Verso Books. 
Anzulovic, B. (1999). Heavenly Serbia: From myth to genocide. NYU Press. 
Auberach, Y. (2009). The Reconciliation Pyramid - A narrative based framework for 
analysing identity conflict. Political Psychology, 30(2), 291-318. 
Balkan Insight. (2016). Retrieved from http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-
kosovo-textbooks-war-sparks-more-protests-02-18-2016 
Banac, I. (1988). The national question of Yugoslavia: origins, history, politics. Cornell 
Uniersity Press. 
Bar Tal, D. (2000). From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution to 
Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis. Political Psychology, 21(2), 351-365. 
Bar Tal, D. (2007). Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflict. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 50(11), 1430-1453. 
Bar Tal, D., & Bennink, G. H. (2004). The nature of reconciliation as an outcome and as a 
process. From conflict resolution to reconciliation.  
Barkan, E. (2001). The guilt of nations: Restitution and negotiating historical injustices. 
New York: W.W. Norton. 
Bar-Simon-Tov, Y. (2004). From conflict resolution to reconciliation. Oxford University 
Press. 
Benomar, J. (1993). Justice after transitions. Journal of Democracy, 4(1), 3-14. 
Bieber, F. D., & Daskalovski, Z. (2003). Understanding the war in Kosovo. Psychology 
Press. 
Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T., & Huyse, L. (2003). Reconciliaiton after violent conflict: A 
handbook. International Idea. 
97 
 
Burema, L. (2012). Reconciliation in Kosovo: A few steps taken, a lon road ahead. JEMIE, 
11(7). 
Burton, J. W. (1969). Conflict & Communication.  
Carmichael, C. (2003). Ethnic cleansing in the Balkans: nationalism and the destruction of 
tradition. Routledge. 
Chicuecue, N. M. (1997). Reconciliation: The role of truth commissions and alternative 
ways of healing. Development in Practice, 7(4), 483–486. 
Clark, J. (2014). Kosovo's Gordian knot: the contested north and the search for a solution. 
Nationalities Papers, 42(3), 526-547. 
Clark, J. N. (2010). Education in Bosnia-Hercegovina: the case for root-and-branch reform. 
Journal of human rights, 9(3), 344-362. 
Coppieters, B. (2008). The Recognition of Kosovo: Exceptional but not unique. In 
Readings in European security (Vol. 28, p. 96). 
Cox, J. K. (2002). The history of Serbia. Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Cubrilovic, V. (1937). The Expulsion of Albanians. Kosova Historical/Political Review, 3. 
Davies, J., & Kaufman, E. (2002). Second Track / Citizens' Diplomacy: An overview. In 
Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy - Concepts and Techniques for Conflcit 
Transformation (pp. 150-162). 
De Greiff, P. (2007). Vetting and transitional justice. In Justice as prevention: Vetting 
public employees in transitional societies (pp. 522-544). 
Deutsch, M. (1973). The resolution of conflict. New Haven: CT: Yale. 
Di Lellio, A., & McCurn, C. (2013). Engineering grasroots Transitional Justice in the 
Balkans: The Case of Kosovo. East European Politics and Societies, 27(1), 129-
148. 
European Council. (2018). European Council. Retrieved from 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/08/eulex-kosovo-new-
role-for-the-eu-rule-of-law-mission/ 
Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International organizations, 49(3), 
379-414. 
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American 
Political Science review, 97(1), 75-90. 
Fearon, J., & Wendt, A. (2002). Rationalism v. constructivism a sceptical view. Handbook 
of international relations, 52-72. 
98 
 
Flournoy, M., & Pan, M. (2002). Dealing with demons: justice and reconciliation. 
Washington Quarterly, 25(4), 111-123. 
Freeman, M., & Hayner, P. B. (2003). Truth Telling. In Reconciliaiton after Violent 
conclit: A Handbook (pp. 597-655). 
Fry, J. D. (2006). The Un Security Council and the law of Armed Conflcit: Amity or 
Enmity. Geo. Washington International Review, 38, 327. 
Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2005). Categorization, recategorization and intergroup 
bias. In On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport (pp. 71-88). 
Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2014). Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup 
identity model. Psychology Press. 
Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). 
The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of 
intergroup bias. European review of social psychology, 4(1), 1-26. 
Gawrich, G. (2006). The crescent and the eagle: Ottoman rule, Islam and the Albanians, 
1874-1913 (Vol. 10). IB Tauris. 
Gellner. (2008). Nations and nationalism. Cornell University Press. 
Gent, S. E. (2013). The politics of international arbitration and adjudication. Penn St. JL& 
International Affairs, 2, 66. 
Gibson, J. L. (2006). The contributions of truth to reconciliation: Lessons from South 
Africa. Journal of conflict resolution, 50(3), 409-432. 
Gobodo-Madikizela, P. (2002). Remorse, forgiveness, and rehumanization: stories from 
South Africa. Journal of humanistic psychology, 42(1), 7-32. 
Hayner, P. B. (2001). Unspeakable truths: confronting terror and atrocity. Psychology 
Press. 
Hayner, P. B. (2002). Unspeakable truths, Facing the challenge of truth commissions (Vol. 
21). New York: Routledge. 
Hewstone, M. e. (2008). Living apart, living together? The role of intergroup contact in 
social integration. Proceedings of the British Academy, 262, 200-300. 
Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Voci, A., McLernon, F., Niens, U., & Noor, M. (2004). 
Intergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland. In Collective guilt: 
International perspectives (pp. 193-215). 
Human Rights Watch. (2000). Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign.  
Human Rights Watch. (2001). Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo.  
99 
 
Humanitarian Law Center. (2018). Humanitarian Law Index. Retrieved from 
http://www.hlc-rdc.org/db/kkp_en/index.html 
Huntington, S. P. (1995). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century 
(Vol. 4). University of Oklahoma Press. 
Huyse, L. (1995). Justice after transition: On the choices successor elites make in dealing 
with the past. Law & Social Inquiry, 47(1), 51-78. 
Huyse, L. (2013). Transitional Justice after war and dictatorships: Learning from 
European experiences (1945-2010). Brussels, Belgium: Centre for Historical 
Research and Documentation on War and Contemporary Society. 
ICTJ. (2018). ICTJ. Retrieved 2018, from https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice 
Ignatieff, M. (2001). The attack on human rights. Foreign Affairs, 102-116. 
Ilic, D. (2004). The Yugoslav truth and reconciliaiton commission.  
IndexMundi. (2018). Retrieved from World Index: https://www.indexmundi.com/Kosovo/ 
Janoff Bulman, R., & Werther, A. (2008). The social psychology of respect: Implications 
for deelgitimaziton and reconciliation. In The social psychology of intergroup 
reconciliaiton (pp. 145-170). 
Jelavich, C., & Jelavich, B. (1977). A history of East Central Europe The establishment of 
the Balkan national states 1804-1920 (Vol. 3). 
Kelman, H. (2008). Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological Perspective. 
In The social psychology of intergroup reconciliation (pp. 15-32). 
Kelman, H. C. (1988). Sociak-Psychological contributions to peacemaking and 
peacebuilding in the Middle East. Applied Psychology, 47(1), 5-28. 
Kelman, H. C. (1998). Building a sustainable peace: The limits of pragmatism in the 
bIsraeli - Palestinian negotiations. Journal of Palestine Studies, 28(1), 36-50. 
Kelman, H. C. (1999). The interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian national identities: 
The role of the other in existential conflicts. Journal of Social Issues, 55(3), 581-
600. 
Kosovo Information Center. (1993). Serbia Colonization and Ethnic Cleansing: Documents 
and Evidence.  
Kritz, N. J. (1995). Transitional justice: How emerging democracies reckon with former 
regimes (Vol. 1). US Institute of Peace Press. 
Lewicki, R. J., & Tomlinson, E. C. (2003). Teh effects of reputation and post violation 
communication on trust and distrust.  
Malcolm, N. (1998). Kosovo. In A short history. London. 
100 
 
Mendeloff, D. (2004). Truth-seeking, truth-telling, and post-conflict peacebuilding: Curb 
the enthusiasm? International Studies Review, 6(3), 355-380. 
Miron, A. M., & Branscombe, N. R. (2008). Social categorization, standards of justice and 
collective guilt. In The social psychology of intergroup reconciliaiton (pp. 77-96). 
Nadler, A., & Schnabel, N. (2008). Instrumental and socioemotional paths to intergroup 
reconciliation and the needs-baased model of socioemotional reconciliation. In The 
social psychology of intergroup reconciliation (pp. 37-56). 
Nadler, A., Malloy, T., & Fisher, J. (2008). The Social Psychology of Intergroup 
Reconciliation. Oxford University Press. 
Nagel, J. (1994). Constructing ethnicity: Creating and recreating ethnic identity and culture. 
Social Problems, 41(1), 152-176. 
Noor, M., Noor, M., Brown, R., Gonzalez, R., Manzi, J., & Lewis, C. A. (2008). On 
positive psychological outcomes: What helps groups with a history conflict to 
forgive an dreconcile with each other? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
34(6), 819-832. 
Offe, C. (1992). Coming to Terms with Past Injustice. Archives Europennes de Sociologie, 
195(33). 
OSCE. (1999). Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told. OSCE/ODIHR. 
Oskamp, S. (2000). Reducing prejudice and discrimination. Psychology Press. 
Parmentier, S. (2003). Global Justice in the Aftermath of Mass Violence. The role of the 
international criminal court in dealing with plitical crimes. Annales Internacionales 
de Criminologie - International Anals of Criminology - Anales Internacionales de 
Crimenologia, 41, 1-2. 
Pejic, J. (2001). Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Shaky Start. The 
Fordham International Law Journal, 25. 
Peral, N. A. (2008). Is civic nationbuilding a tool for conflict transformation? The Kosova's 
Case. Albanian journal of Politics. 
Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. Annual review of psychology, 49(1), 68-
85. 
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). Relationships between intergroup contact and 
prejudice among minority and majority status groups. Psychological Science, 90(5), 
751. 
Reychler, L., & Paffenholz, T. (. (2001). Peacebuidling: A Field Guide. Lynne Rienner 
Publisher. 
101 
 
Rouhana, N. N., & Bar Tal, D. (1998). Psuchological dynamics of intractable ethnonational 
conflicts: The israeli-palestinian case. American Psychologist, 53(7), 761. 
Sherif, M. (1966). In common predicament: Social psychology of intergroup conflict and 
cooperation. Houghton Mifflin Comp. 
Staub, E. (2006). Reconciliation After Genocide, Mass Killing, or Intractable Conflict: 
Understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery, and Steps Toward a 
General Theory. Political Psychology, 6(27), 867-894. 
Stephan, W. &. (2001). Improving intergroup relations. SAGE publications. 
Sverrisson, H. B. (2006). Truth and Reconciliation commission in Kosovo: A Window of 
Opportunity? Peace, Conflcit and Development, 8, 1-26. 
Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology. CUP 
Archive. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integratative theory of intergroup conflict. Teh social 
psychology of intergroup relations, 33(47). 
Todorova, M. (1994). The Balkans: From discovery to invention. Slavic Review, 53(2), 
453-482. 
Transparency International Kosova. (2012). Corruption Perceptions Index 2012. 
Transparency International. 
Turner, J. C. (1999). Some current issues in research on social identity and self-
categorization theories. In Social identity: Context, commitment, content (Vol. 37, 
pp. 6-34). 
Tutu, D. (1999). No future without forgiveness. New York. 
UNHCR - OSCE. (2000-2002). Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo.  
UNHCR. (2001). Assessment of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo.  
UNHCR. (2017). Internally Displaced Persons In Kosovo.  
Vasa, P. (1879). E Verteta Per Shqiperine dhe Shqipetaret (The Truth on Albania and 
Albanians). Tirana: Shtepia Botuese Naim Frasheri. 
Vogelman, L. (1993). It's hard to forgive - even harder to forget. 
Waller, M., Drezov, K., & Gökay, B. (2001). Kosovo: The politics of delusion. Taylor & 
Francis US. 
Whitehead, L. (1996). The international dimensions of democratization: Europe and 
americas. Oxford University Press. 
Whitley, B., & Kite, M. (2009). The psychology of prejudice and discrimination. In 
Cengage Learning.  
102 
 
Yamagishi, T., & Yamagishi, M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the United States and 
Japan. Motivation and Emotion, 129-166. 
Yannis, A. (2009). The politics and geopolitics of the status of Kosovo: the circle is never 
round. Sotheast European and Black Sea Studies, 9(1-2), 161-170. 
Zalaquett, J. (1990). Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former 
Governmnets: Applicable Principles an dpolitical Constraints. Hamline L. Rev., 13, 
623. 
Zupan, N. (2006). Facing the past and transitional justice in countries of former 
Yugoslavia. In Peacebuilding and Civill Society in Bosnia-herzegovina. Ten years 
after Dayton (pp. 327-342). 
Zyberi, G., & Letnar Cernic, J. (2015). Transitional Justice Processes and Reocnciliation in 
the Former Yugoslavia: Challenges and Prospects. Nordic Journal of Human 
Rights, 33(2), 132-157. 
 
 
 
 
  
103 
 
APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW DETAILS 
 
Interview # City Ethnicity Gender Age 
1 Gjakove Albanian Male 20s 
2 Gjakove Albanian Male 30s 
3 Gjakove Albanian Male 30s 
4 Gjakove Albanian Male 20s 
5 Gjakove Albanian Male 50s 
6 Gjakove  Serb Male  50s 
7 Gjakove Albanian Female 50s 
8 Gjakove Albanian Female 20s 
9 Gjakove Albanian Male 40s 
10 Gjakove Albanian Male 50s 
11 Gjakove Albanian Male 80s 
12 Gjakove Albanian Female 50s 
13 Gjakove Albanian Female 20s 
14 Gjakove Serb Male 20s 
15 Gjakove Serb Male 50s 
16 Gjakove Serb Male 50s 
17 Gjakove Serb Male 50s 
18 Gjakove Albanian Female 20s 
19 Gjakove Serb Male 30s 
20 Gjakove Albanian Male 40s 
21 Peje Albanian Male 70-80 
22 Peje Albanian Male 60s 
23 Peje Albanian Male 60s 
24 Peje Albanian Female 60s 
25 Peje Serb Female 50s 
26 Peje Serb Male 60-70 
27 Peje Albanian Female 30s 
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28 Peje Albanian Female 30s 
29 Peje Serb Male 30s 
30 Peje Albanian – 
Turkish 
Female 70s 
31 Peje Albanian Female  20s 
32 Peje Albanian Male 20s 
33 Peje Serb Female 20s 
34 Peje Albanian Female 20s 
35 Peje Serb Male  50s 
36 Peje Albanian Male 30s 
37 Peje Albanian Male 20s 
38 Peje Serb Male 30s 
39 Peje Albanian Male 20s 
40 Peje Albanian Female 20s 
 
 The interviewees in yellow requested to not be personally quoted in any of the 
discussions.   
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APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW ATTEMPTED QUESTIONS 
 
Main question the thesis addresses:  
Have reconciliatory measures in Kosovo affected inter-group relations?  
The questions are divided in 5 parts, according to the themes I’m looking to find. The 
reasons I have coded them so is for the later analysis to be easier.  
Themes:  
- Ingroup Identity 
- Responsibility  
- Empathy 
- Trust  
- Forgiveness  
The chronology and the flow of the questions is meant to replicate the path of the ‘perfect’ 
reconciliation process and go from more institutional, top tier measures, to grassroots 
levels.  
The interviews will be conducted in the native language of the interviewees or in English.  
The interviews are planned to be semi-structured.  
 
Introduction question:  
- What is the first thing to come to your mind regarding 1999? 
 
Ingroup Identity:  
1- What was the event that affected you the most  
2- Did you take part in any of the fights? Y/N, Would you like to explain more 
regarding the reasons you did/didn’t do so?  
3- How would you define the groups that were fighting at the time?  
4- How would you understand whether someone was on the same side as you? Were 
there clear lines?  
5- What was the position the (outgroup) living in this city took during the fights? 
 
Responsibility:  
1- What do you think lies at the base of this conflict?  
2- What do you think could have prevented the deterioration of the conflict? 
3- Have you kept up with the state policies regarding the adjudication past crimes?  
/ Do you think a legal process is the right/sufficient way to deal with the post-
conflict situations?  
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4- Do you see an ultimate perpetrator in this conflict? Y/N, Why do you think so? 
5- Do you find a difference between the (outgroup) government/institutions and the 
(outgroup) itself? 
  
 
Empathy: 
1- Have you ever thought about the other group’s approach to the conflict? 
2- Do you think the ‘feelings’ (lack of a better term in English) about the conflict are 
mutual?  
3- In your opinion, what was the major event that the other party suffered?  
4- What do you think that event changed? Was it a good or bad turn of events? 
5- How has that affected their present situation?  
 
Trust: 
1- How would you describe the relations between your ingroup and outgroup post-
conflict?  
2- Do you think there might be a re-occurrence of the events? Y/N, Why? 
3- Are you regularly in touch with the outgroup?  
4- Do you trust (outgroup) more now? Y/N, Why? What makes you feel so? 
5- Would you vote for a government official from the outgroup to represent you?  
 
Forgiveness:  
1- What about on a personal level, would you have a preference regarding the ethnicity 
of someone you’re in inter-personal relations with?  
2- What do you think the past has taught you?  
3- If you were the ultimate decision maker on a local or central level, how would you 
deal with the post-conflict situation? Do you support the idea of a reconciliatory 
process overall?  
4- How would you define a better future? Do you think it’s wanted by both sides and 
do you think it’s possible with the steps that have been taken so far?  
5- What is your definition of peace for Kosovo?  
 
 
 
 
